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r' I. THE CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR 
1. THE SOCIAL CLEAVAGE 
------THE present military insurrection against the legiti-mate Spanish government is an attempt to destroy those forces which have undertaken to make Spain 
a modern, progressive nation. 
Not so long ago Spain ruled parts of the United State8 
and large territories to the south of it. Spanish explorers 
and conquerors had pushed into the 8€Ven seas carrying 
Spanish influence and culture with them. Spain was mis-
tress of vast domains., a mighty and weathy power. Since 
then she has sunk to the level of a third-rate nation. Her 
people are as enterprising as in the heyday of her glory. 
Her geographical position on the Atlantic and Mediter-
ranean is as strategic and favorable. Her natura.} resources 
are greater than those of Italy . Yet she has become a 
miserably poor, backward, unhappy country. Somebody 
must .be responsible for this stagnation and 'retrogression. 
I t must be the people who have ruled Spain in recent 
centuries~ And those very ruling classes were the initiators 
and are now the backbone of the revolt against the Madrid 
government. While England made the Industrial Revolu-
tion and France her great political . revolution, the land-
lords of Spain refused to let the clock go forward. In 
many respects Spain is still medieval, the Czarist Russia 
of 1937. 
. The bloodless overthrow of the monarchy in 1931 was 
an effort. to expel the Middle Ages and to introduce the 
twentieth century into Spain. The enlightened bourgeoisie, 
the intellectuals, the workingmen, and the peasants banded 
together to rid the country of the incubus of medievalism. 
But though the physically subnormal and ment{tlly disin-
tegrated House of Bourbon, incapable of the slightest re-
sistance, allowed itself to be SW€pt into the dustbin of 
history, the republic was too weak, perhaps because too 
indecisive, to dislodge ' the social stratum on which the 
monarchy had rested. The feudal barons accepted the form 
of the republic in order the better to destroy its content. 
They obstructed every reform which might have dissipated 
social unrest and raised the standard of living. The most 
burning need was the alleviation of the lot of tke peasants, 
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who were serfs in fact if not in name. I visited Andalusian 
villages in 1934 where no peasant owned land. Whole 
farming communities had not a single horse or cow or sheep 
or pig. In the village of Pueblo del Rio, half an hour from 
the much-advertised tourist city of Seville, a peasant said 
to me: "I ate my cat today and it was the first time I had 
tasted meat in six months." The farmers lived in mud huts 
with earthen floors and no tables. Indeed, tables would have 
been totally superfluous, for they never sat down to a meal. 
They subsisted on an unvaried diet of lentils, black sugar-
less coffee, and bread. Tens of thousands of Spanish peas-
ants have for decades lived in a state of semi-starvation. 
Whole villages feed on boiled grasses ' and roots. As one 
moves through the countryside, one can see hundreds. of 
families in cave dwellings. Those are their permanent homes. 
It is a well-known fact that this low, almost animal exis-
tence has reduced many country folk to the mental level 
of cretins and morons. 
The republic came into being to alter these conditions. 
It found Spain 72 per cent agricultural-a token of under-
. development and backwardness. It was a country of idle 
rich and idle poor, of big landlords and poverty-stricken 
peasants. One per cent of the population owned 51.5 per 
cent of its soil, whereas 40 per cent owned no' land at all. 
In the June, 1925, issue of the International Labor 
Review, Dr. Fernando de los Rios, later Spanish Am-
bassador to the United States, published the results of 
his investigations into agrarian conditions in the entire 
registration area, which covers one-third of Spain. In 
Galicia, he wrote, the peasantry "is not simply poor but 
almost destitute." This province, with an area of 2,900,000 
hectares, counted 2,500,000 holdings, little more than 
one .hectare per family, whereas between ten and twelve hec-
tares are required to support a family. The registration 
area of 17,000,000 hectares was divided into 6,130,000 
holdings-about three hectares per farm-but 514 land-
owners in the province of Caceres owned 566,415 hectares. 
The spread between the upper and lower classes was 
vast. Millions had not even a tiny patch for the cultivation 
of potatoes, but in 1936 the Duke of Medinaceli owned 
195,680 acres, the Duke of Penaranda 104,345 acres, the 
Duke of Alba 89,625 acres, the Marquis de Comillas 42,795 
acres, the Duke of Lerma 25,560 acres, and so on down 
a long list of titled and untitled landowners who received 
sufficient income from their ill-managed estates· to lead 
, 
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luxurious lives in Madrid or Paris or London while the 
hired labor on their lands eked out a humiliating existence. 
In several provinces of Spain laws existed which prohibited 
the use of machinery. With plenty of water in rivers and 
whole provinces requiring irrigation, nothing was done to 
in troduce it. 
History assigned to the Spanish Republic the task of 
removing the taboo on progress. It had to increase agri-
cultural output, making the farmer a bigger consumer of 
city goods and thus stimulating the growth of domestic 
industries. By solving the land problem Spain could become 
an advanced and prosperous nation. 
2. REACTION FIGHTS THE REPUBLIC 
These matters were urgent. Yet the Republicans pro-
ceeded slowly and cautiously. They were aware of the 
opposition they would meet from the landlords. I discussed 
this question in March, 1934, with Manuel Azafia, who had 
been Prime Minister of Spain between October, 1931, and 
September, 1933. "Agrarian change," he said, "is the most 
important issue facing the. republic." In office, however, 
it took him a year and a half to draft a new land law. The 
explanation he gave was that the estate owners offered 
so much resistance to his political and religious reforms 
that he did not dare to venture into the more dangerous, 
because more fundamental, realm of economic reform. The 
result? In April, 1934, three years after the founding of 
the republic, fewer than ten thousand peasants had re-
ceived land from the state. 
While Azalia was in power he raised the wages of fann 
laborers by means of legislation. The moment he was 
ousted by the reactionaries, wages were lowered. The Re-
publicans had undertaken public works to reduce unem-
ployment. Their successors in office discontinued them. On 
March 7, 1934, Largo Caballero, later Prime lVlinister of 
Spain, said to me: "Spain under the republic received the 
best social legislation in the world. But the present Ler-
roux Cabinet has made it a dead letter." What a Republi-
can ministry did was immediately undone by -the disguised 
monarchists who superseded it. "I tied myself with legal 
bonds," Azalia said to me in 1934, "yet even so the rights 
. objected." The aristocrats, landlords, and army chiefs did 
not realize that moderate reforms, by mollifying the peas-
antry, could save ~he ruling groups from extinction. They 
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closed their ears to the call which had" summoned the re-
public into existence to solve Spain's problems. 
Strangely enough, Spain's small industrialist class sup-
ported the reactionary position taken by the landlords. 
The industrialists should have welcomed a land reform 
which would create a home market for their goods~ But 
they believed that more than economics was involved. They 
feared that the granting of land to the peasantry would 
rob the owning classes of political power. The manufac-
turers, therefore, who should have encouraged the republic 
in its attempts to stage a peaceful revolution which would 
have enriched the country, actually leagued themselves 
with the backward-looking landlords to prevent all ameli-
oration and reform. 
The purpose for which the republic was founded was 
thus thwarted. The monarchists threatened to capture the 
republic and subject it to their will. The people lost faith 
in the "new regime. In the villages of Andalusia I asked 
the peasants in 1934 what the repuhlic had given them. 
They said it had given them nothing. One woman cried 
out: "Damn the republic!" 
"Wha t is your hope?" I inquired. 
"We are waiting for death," they" replied. 
"Why don't you seize the land?" I t}:len asked. 
"The answer is in two words," a political leader in the 
village of Pueblo del Rio replied. "Guardia Civil." They 
feared the police. The rights were ruling by means of ter-
ror. They were guided by principles antagonistic to the 
republic, its constitution, and fundamental law. 
In October, 1934, the resentment of the workers ex-
ploded. A rev6l t broke out in the Asturias mining region 
in northern Spain. The reactionary government brought 
in Moorish troops from Africa and quelled the insurrec-
tion. "The rights suppressed the Asturias rising," Azafia 
said to me subsequently, "with a cruelty unparalleled in 
history." 
Disaffection spread throughout the country. The eco-
nomic situation went from bad to worse. "The financial 
position of the nation," Azafia declared, "was calamitous, 
and the entire social order was in a state of collapse." The 
sorely tried millions of city and farm laborers despaired 
of politics and of parliamentary government. Even re-
formist Socialists, whose entire careers had been built on a 
denial of revolution, began to see that Spain's only salva-
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tion lay in a violent ejection of the monarchists who had 
emasculated the republic. 
Bourgeois and Socialist Republicans now realized that if 
no ray of hope appeared to the village and city masses an 
explosion of popular wrath would engulf them all. There 
was a danger of spontaneous peasant and urban riots 
which would be drowned in blood by the ruthless authorities, 
unless the Republicans showed themselves capable of effec-
tive political action. Spurred by this necessity and taught 
by the sorry fate of the divided democracies of Germany, 
Austria, and other countries, Spanish Republicans of all 
hues formed a united front and went to the polls on Feb-
ruary 16, 1936, to elect a new parliament. l\luch to their 
own surprise, the Popular Front succeeded in winning a 
majority of the Cortes seats. The present Loyalist govern-
ment is the child of that legally elected Cortes. 
3. THE POPULAR FRONT IN POWER 
In the elections of February 16 and in several supple-
mentary pons which took place on l\farch 1, the Popular 
Front fusion -ticket received 4,206,156 votes against 
3,783,601 for the right parties and 681,047 for the center 
parties. (After the insurrection some of the center sym-
pathized with the Loyalists.) The division of seats in the 
Cortes was: 258 for the Popular Front; 152 for the Right; 
62 for the center. 
The Popular Front woIl; this victory even though in-
numerable Anarchists, who form the largest party sup-
porting the Loyalists, in conson~nce with their anti-
political principles, stayed away from the polls. It won 
despite the fact that before and on election day a reac-
tionary government was in power in a country where elec-
tioneering terror is a fine art. It won against the open and 
vigorous opposition of the higher Catholic clergy. During 
the election campaign the Bishop of Barcelona, for in-
stance, declared: "It is sinful to vote for the Popular 
Front. A vote-for the conservative candidate is a vote 'for 
Christ." The Archbishop of Toledo urged his followers to 
"vote for the Catholic candidates, for you will thereby 
please the Holy Father." 
N otwithstandjng these formidable handicaps the Popu-
lar Front carried off the victory, and immediately there-
after a new Cabinet was set up which consisted entirely of 
liberal bourgeois Republicans but enjoyed the parliamen-
tary support of the Socialists and Communists. Manuel 
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Azafia became Prime Minister once again. The attitude 
of the reactionaries to the Popular Front victory was ex-
pressed by General Franco himself in an interview at 
Tetuan with the London News Chronicle (July 29, 1936). 
"What about the February elections?" the correspondent 
asked. "Didn't they represent the national will?" "Elec-
tions never do," Franco replied. 
The new Azafia government was lifted into office on a 
wave of widespread peasant and labor discontent. It had 
amanda te to rule more radically than its predecessors. 
The people were insisting on more drastic measures to im-
prove their lot. But the reactionaries remained blind to 
these facts, and the second Azafia government accordingly 
conceived of its role as that of buffer between the impa-
tient masses and the recalcitrant landlords with their 
lay and other allies. 
Azafia is a man of great culture and integrity. Edu-
cated in the famous Escorial monastery, he became a 
prominent jurist and a leading intellectual. Author of sey-
eral plays, three novels, a story of his youth entitled "The 
Garden of the l\lonks," which is one of the gems of the 
Spanish language, " and a translation from the English of 
Borrow's "The Bible in Sp~in," he is so balanced a com-
bina tion of the intellectual and the politician that he could 
easily forsake the one role for the other. When I inter-
viewed him on April 4, 1936, my final question was, "Will 
you be here a year from now when I come back?" 
"Of course," he replied, "unless I get bored with 
politics." 
Boredom and excessive excitement may achieve the same 
result in the intellectual; but when he became Prime Min-
ister again in February, 1936, Azafia occupied a strong 
position. His strength lay in the fact that although he 
was an ally of the Socialists and Communists, he was 
simultaneously the last hope of the bourgeoisie. The own-
ing classes did not wish to unseat him because he was a 
firm bulwark ' against socialism, and the workers and peas-
ants supported him because they were still too weak for a 
direct struggle with the bourgeoisie. Tactically this posi-
tion was good, but it condemned "Azafia to a policy of no 
initiative, for in himself he had no political strength. His 
party, consisting of government office-holders, professional 
men, and enlightened business peopl~, was numerically 
small. Because of Spain's economic underdevelopment the 
middle class was too puny to serve as buffer or bridge 
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between the oppressed lower classes and the oppressing 
upper classes. There was therefore little contact or un-
derstanding between them. Azana tried to help by acting as 
little as possible, but he probably came too late. While the 
landlords were as unyielding and stubborn as 'ever, the 
peasants soon began to help themselves. "Hunger and un-
employment," wrote the Madrid correspondent of the con-
servative London Times, "are driving the inhabitants [of 
rural districts] to despair." 
The movement started in the large and poor province 
of Caceres. Here, during Azana's first term as Prime Min-
ister, several thousand Yunteros, or owners of a yoke of 
mules but no land, had been allowed to rent part of the 
unused estates of large feudal barons. In 1934-35, how-
ever, while the Gil Robles-Lerroux reactionary forces con-
trolled the government, these Y wnteros were again driven 
off. After the Popula:r Front electoral victory the peas-
ants felt encouraged, and in the province of Caceres they 
. presented the provincial branch of the federal Institute" of 
Agrarian Reform with an ultimatum: If you do not give 
us land in forty-eight hours, we will take it. On March 7, 
1936, accordingly, Senor de 1a Fuente, chief of the Caceres 
branch of the institute, published a circular asking pro-
prietors to rent some land to landless peasants. When I 
talked with De la Fuente in Caceres in April, he had re-
ceived not a single reply. Five days after the institute's 
circular to -the proprietors the peasants therefore marched 
with their mules and plows to the landlords' estates and 
each marked off for himself a modest parcel which he sub-: 
sequently tilled and paid rent for. 
In the neighboring province of Badajoz, hard by the 
Portuguese frontier, economic conditions were even worse 
than in Caceres. The- region had 702,000 inhabitants 
(175,000 families), of whom between 80 and 90 per cent 
lived on the soiL Land ownership was heavily concentrated; 
2,946 proprietors owned 40 per cent of the total s:urf ace 
of the province. Practically no proprietors fell in the class 
owning between two and fifty hectares. There was, in other 
words, no rural middle class. There were the holders of 
vast latifundia and the impecunious Yunteros. On March 
25 in 150 villages of Badajoz, the peasants assembled at 
5 a. m. with their stock and their implements and solemnly 
drew lots to decide which Ywnteros were to go to what 
esta tes. No violence or resistance marked this oc~asion. 
The authorities were now Socialist and they confined the 
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Guardia Civil to barracks. The Yunteros plo~ed a furrow 
around their individual plots and then and there made 
public announcement of their occupation of the land. The 
land still belonged to the proprietors and had been taken 
merely in tenancy. The rent was paid to the owner through 
the Institute of Agrarian Reform, which legalized the 
Y wnteros' action. 
In this manner, within two months, 41,499 Yunteros had 
been settled on 1,502 estates covering 105,090 hectares in 
Badajoz, while 24,702 Yunteros had been settled on 948 
estates covering 59,621 hectares in Caceres. In other prov-
inces the land reform had scarcely got under way by the 
spring of 1936. 
In April I discussed the new situation with Prime Min-
ister Azana. "Might not these changes on the land," I ven-
tured, "strengthen the ca pitalist regime in the cities by 
creating a richer peasant market for industrial commodi-
ties ?'~ 
"Yes," he frankly replied. "They will strengthen the ur-
ban bourgeoisie. But that bourgeoisie is not anti-repub-
lican." 
Senor Ruiz-Funez, Azana's Minister of Agriculture, 
took the same view. No land, he said, had been confiscated 
by the new regime. The Y unteros were only being settled 
as tenant farmers. In 1936 the government's plan was to 
allocate land to 80,000 farmers. "This method of land re-
form, by renting land to Ywnteros," Ruis-Funez said 
to me, "will weaken the tendency toward socialism." That, 
as the left bourgeois Republicans saw it, would be the most 
salutary effect of'the Yuntero movement. 
I wished to learn for myself whether the hopes of Azana 
and Ruiz-Funez were likely to be fulfilled. During and after 
the period when the land reform was at its height I trav-
eled 2,000 kilometers through Caceres, Badaj oz; and six 
other provinces in an attempt to feel the pulse of the peas-
antry. The advent of the Popular Front government and 
especially the new era in land tenure had stirred them pro-
foundly. On the plaza of the little town of Caceres I ac-
costed three woolly mountaineer Yunteros dressed in dark, 
patched corduroy suits and big black sombreros. They 
came from the village of Malpartida de Caceres, where 
6,000 hectares of land had been distributed among the 
peasants. "We were in a cage before," one of them said to 
me, "and now we are out." They would harvest a crop in 
1937 and until then they would live by hauling. All of 
10 
them were Socialists. They did not know what the land 
would cost them, whether they would keep it, or whether 
they would get more. But they had land, and they were 
pleased. "It is a beginning," the youngest said. 
En route to Trujillo, where Francisco Pizarro, the con-
queror of Peru was born, I stopped on a road that led 
through the estate of the Count of Torrearas. A man was 
plowing. With my friends of the Institute of Agrarian 
Reform, 1 got out of the automobile and beckoned to him. 
In true Spanish fashion he yelled to us to meet him half-
way. He was Facundo Martin, a Yuntero who had received 
land for cultivation at a rental. He said that his situation 
was better, that the Yunteros who had got land were satis-
fied. It was not his land, he said. "I only work here. 1 
would like to have my own farm. I work myself to death to 
earn enough to pay the high rent." The rent would amount 
to between one-quarter and one-third of his crop. Facundo 
was twenty-four years 'old and unmarried. "Life isn't good 
enough to marry," he said. 
At Barcarrota, a village of white, smooth-faced homes 
in Badaj oz, 1 chanced upon a Socialist meeting. About 
300 men and-women were assembled at the Casa del Pueblo, 
or people's house, to hear a speaker who had not arrived. 
1 was offered the opportunity of putting questions to the 
audience and I took advantage of it avidly. I mounted a 
rude wooden platform and said: 
"Why are you Socialists?" 
"Because we want liberty," one woman replied. 
"Because we don't want to starve," another added. 
"Don't you eat enough?" I asked. The reply was a 
burst of laughter. I suggested that those who ate meat 
twice a week, raise their hands. No hand went up. 
"Who eats meat once a week?" Not a hand went up. A 
woman rose and explained that the regular diet of most 
of them consisted of vegetable soup, black coffee,-bread-
when they had it-and sometimes sardines. 
"Don't the children have milk?" I inquired. Several 
mothers with babies on their arms, pointed to their breasts. 
"Yes," one said, "while they get it from us, but not 
later." 
I now came to the subject which interested m.e most. 
"Have you received land from the new government?" 
Yes. All of them had received land. They hoped now 
they would live better. But they had to eat untjl the new 
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· crop came in and they had no money. Moreover, they would 
need money for tools, animals, and seed. 
"We have land now, but it is too little for a decent liv-
ing," one man volunteered. Applause greeted this state-
ment. ~ 
"How is it," I probed, "that Azafia, who is a bourgeois, 
has given you land?" 
"The Socialists forced him!" 
"We made him do it!" 
"He had to!" 
These exclamatIons expressed the sense of the meeting. 
"And won't you all now become little capitalists?" 
This provoked much mirth. 
"Maybe we will some day live like human beings instead 
'of animals." 
"What about the landlords?" I asked. Derisive laughler. 
"Let them weep a bit as we have been weeping all our 
lives," a mother proposed. 
"Suppose the rights came back and took the land 
away," I asked. 
"They will have to kill us first!" 
"They will never be allowed to come back to office." 
"They cannot force us to starve any longer!" 
These and many other contacts with .YUAntero8 who had 
received land warranted a number of conclusions: The 
Yunteros were pleased that they had land. They were more 
optimistic. They hoped to get additional land and perhaps 
loans from the state for equipment and cattle. They be-
lieved that the Socialist Party, to which most of them 
adherec;I, would help them in doing" so. They were no longer 
in a mood for violent or desperate action. Azafia's land 
reform, which ·had commenced in the provinces where con-
ditions were most critical, would probably give the peasants 
some hope and inaugurate a period of peace and adjust-
ment in the countryside. Come what might, however, the 
peasants would not allow themselves -to be driven off the 
land as they had been in the past by reactionary govern-
ments. They would further support the Popular Front 
and resist the politicians of the right. 
I sat on a stone step in the central square of Badaj oz 
waiting for my companions, who had gone into a cafe for a 
drink, and I entered this note in my book. "Azafia is sav-
ing himself without saving Spain. His land reform will 
temporarily gratify the Yuntero8 but will do little for the 
national economy." The land reform promised to raise the 
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standard of living slightly, but something more fundamen-
tal was necessary in order to banish misery and industrial 
stagnation from Spain. Azafia and the engineers of the 
Institute of Agrarian Reform were talking about farming 
collectives. In some sections, indeed, the peasants, on their 
own initiative and without ever having heard of collectives 
in the Soviet Union, had organized cooperative farms. The 
Socialists and Communists, however, put little trust in 
Azafia's land reform. In April, 1936, Largo Caballero, the 
Socialist leader told me that the people who were then 
getting land would not be able to sell their crops. In 1934 
and 1935 there had been surplus food in the country while 
thousands starved. The ultimate solution was collectiviza-
tion, Caballero declared, but Azalia would not go so far. 
Though disgruntled with Azafia's halfway measures, the 
Socialists and Communists continued, nevertheless, to bol-
ster up his authority. They were sure he would fail, but 
they were patient with him in the face of the specter of 
reactionary rule that rose up the moment the idea of un-
sea ting Azalia was broached. . 
The landlords, on the other hand, looked with great dis-
favor on Azalia's mild land reform. The feudal barons of 
Spain were wedded to the ancient Roman conception of 
private property rights whi~h brooked not the slightest in-
terference. Utterly devoid of social outlook, and interested 
most of. all in protecting their inherited privileges and 
wealth against any encroachment, they overflowed with 
bitterness toward the Popular Front government and the 
peasantry. During my trip through Estremadura and An-
dalusia in the spring of 1936, I talked to .several big land-
lords who looked upon the forced renting of land to the 
Y wnteros as the beginning of the end, the doom of the 
divine right of landowners. The landowners of all Spain 
saw in the events in Caceres and Badajoz a portent of what 
would soon happen to them. That they could not, for the 
moment, resist the government's measures made them hate 
the government all the more. 
I t was obvious that the possessing classes would not 
easily reconcile themselves to a land reform which they 
. regarded as the opening wedge for socialism. In the months 
of March and April the reactionary rights were undoubt-
edly thinking of modes of resistance. It is possible, in the 
light of subsequent developments, that they were already 
doing more than thinking. The February elections had 
stunned them. Many of the prominent aristocrats literally 
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fled; they went abroad and transferred their money abroad, 
but enough fight was left in the rest of them to put the 
Republicans on guard. As Caballero said to me on April 
3, 1936, "Now the reactionaries can come back into office 
only through a coup d'etat." The estate owners had always 
found means of compelling their farm hands to vote for the 
right parties. In many villages inhabited by perhaps three 
landlord families and hundreds of Socialist Yunteros the 
balloting had often shown a maj ority for some black con-
servative candidate. Now, with the land reform, the barons 
would lose this possibility of electoral pressure. They thus 
not only resented tpe recent economic changes, but also 
were afraid that being numerically few they might never 
again recapture political power. The electoral victory of 
the Popular Front seemed like the handwriting on the wall. 
Writing from Barcelona on April 16, 1936, I said: 
"Spain obviously must do something about her poverty 
and backwardness. The peasants and city workers demand 
better conditions. The right reactionaries, when in office, 
answered these demands with terror but nothing else, thus 
documenting a fact which is becoming clear to an increas-
ing number of Spaniards-that the reactionaries have lost 
the right and never had the ability to rule the country. 
This is a very favorable development, and if the liberal 
Republicans, Socialists, and Communists behave wisely, the 
electoral .vi·ctory which they won exactly two months ago 
will keep their enemies out of power for a long, long time, 
perhaps forever. The right reactionaries are the large 
landed proprietors, the church, the monarchists, and the 
few big industrialists. They are depressed, frightened, and 
disorganized. Their chief hope at the moment is a violent 
coup d'etat with the aid of the army and the Civil Guard." 
4. THE FORCES BEHIND FRANCO: 
LANDLORDS, INDUSTRIALISTS, ARMY, AND CHURCH 
The possibility of a right uprising was on everybody's 
lips during the spring of 1936. In fact, several false alarms 
were sounded ~hile I was in Madrid during the first fort-
night of April, tanks and armed guards patrolled the 
streets, and the Socialists and Communists mobilized their 
poorly equipped militia to take pqsts on housetops. The 
long-awaited army coup in behalf of landlordism and retro-
gression took place on July 17, 1936. The government 
might have anticipated this move but did not. 
Four forces stood behind the revolt-the army, the land-
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lords, the big industrialists, and the church. These received 
support from Italian and German fascism. One power 
stood against it-the Spanish people. 
According to the most authoritative study. published in 
Madrid in 1932 and quoted with approval in the Foreign 
Policy Association's report on Spain dated January 15, 
1937, the number of Spanish landlords who owned 250 hec-
tares or more did not exceed fifteen or twenty thousand. 
With their families, therefore, the landowning class of 
Spain totaled something like 75,000 persons. Their indo-
lence, combined with fear of a rising of the peasant masses, 
had undermined their trust in the Spanish earth. They 
allowed wheat lands to be put to grazing, and when the 
Republican Institute of Agrarian Reform urged them to 
reverse this process, the usual complaint was that the gov-
ernment threatened to ruin their flocks. The landlords 
took out of the land the maximum and gave back the mini-
mum. The average annual production of wheat per hectare 
was 806 kilograms compared with four times that yield in -
many European countries. For years there was almost no 
investment in Spanish agriculture. Estates were misn1an-
aged by overseers who acted at the same time as village 
political bosses and. delivered the votes on election day. 
Idle, fashionable scions of landlords preferred the cafes of 
Madrid and Paris to the dry fields of Estremadura. The 
landowning class was losing its vigor and not reproducing 
its wealth, yet even where farms were only partially culti-
vated the estate owners held tenaciously to their property 
rights and objected to the rental of land . to landless peas-
ants. This small decadent class, more than any other, held 
Spain in its clutches. 
The industrialists, whose plants were for the most part 
in the rich cities of Barcelona and Bilbao, were the land-
lords' allies. As in Russia, industrial progress in Spain had 
been a mushroom growth and brought with it strong 
working-class organization. But the manufacturers hated 
this child which entertained ambitions of b€ing their grave-
digger. And their hate made them a.pprehensive and reac-
tionary. 
The Spanish army, another powerful element of reac-
tion, was not a class but a caste rooted in the rural and 
urban owning classes. The army was in many respects au-
tonomous, and according to Gil Robles, the leader of the 
Catholic Popular Action Party, writing in the June 5, 
1937, issue of America, it will be autonomous if and when 
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Franco wins. "Initiator of the national Spanish movement 
and hope of its future," Gil Robles declares, "is the army, 
which is really independent of any of the political parties 
that support it." The character of the Spanish army is 
strikingly revealed by its composition. In 1931 when the 
republic was established there were 21,000 officers in the 
army, or about as many as in the German army just before 
the World War; 21,000 officers to 130,000 men. There was 
one general for every 150 soldiers. The army consumed 
30 per cent of the national budget, and for every $3 spent 
on equipment and pay for the ranks, $10 went as officers' 
salaries. Perhaps the military caste did not wish to make 
soldiers of the peasants and working men who would nor-
mally be the conscripts. Perhaps it was convinced that 
Spain was not threatened by invasion and could always 
with benefit remain neutral in a maj or European conflict. 
Yet the army, what with the Foreign Legion and the Mo-
roccan auxiliaries, made the officers strong enough to wield 
enormous influence in the monarchy as well as in the repub-
lic. Army tribunals before 1931 tried civilians as well as 
soldiers. The status of officer was sacrosanct. Alfonso XliI 
lavished on the armed forces huge s~ms which too fre-
quently went into the pockets of generals and army con-
tractors. John Hay's observation in 1~70 that "the Span-
ish army from general to corporal is penetrated with con-
spiracy" was equally true six decades later. The army was 
corrupt, inefficient, and loyal only to that government 
which did not offend the interests of the classes from which 
its officers sprang. 
The republic knew this, but it was generous to the point 
of folly. It offered to reti~e into the reserve at full pay all 
officers who were in disagreement with republican principles. ' 
Eight thousand officers availed themselves of this oppor-
tunity to live in complete leisure and whisper and conspire 
in cafes against the new government. Even Azafia's Popu-
lar Front Cabinet' tolerated the evils of the army and of 
the Civil Guard, a special police force numbering from 
30,000 to 40,000 men. Shortly beJore the July revolt the 
government belatedly roused itself to feeble action. It 
shifted General Francisco Franco, who had been appointed 
chief of staff by Gil Robles, to the Canary Islands, and . 
General Goded to the Balearics. Here · they were better 
able to plot the overthrow of the government. By trans-
ferring them Madrid warned them that something worse 
might be in store for disloyal officers. They took the warn-
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ing and planned the revolt. They had ~aken an oath of 
loyalty to the Spanish government and the Spanish con-
stitution. Now they attempted forcibly to overthrow that 
government, only recently elected by popular vote. Never-
theless, many foreigners who loudly denounce alleged be-
lievers in the overthrow of governments by violence, have 
sympathized with and aided the Spanish rebels. This incon-
sistency would be worthy of more comment if there were 
not so much hypocrisy in politics already. The protagonists 
of "law and order" object to violent attacks on regimes 
which serve their purposes; but they applaud the Spanish -
military insurrection against a regime which they dislike. 
From the very beginning of the army's insurrection, the 
Catholic church of Spain has been at the service of the 
rebels. Some priests in Loyalist territory staunchly sup-
port the legal government, and in the Basque country the 
Catholics have taken sides against Franco. But on the 
whole the Catholic hi~rarchy has been the partisan of those 
who rose up to overthrow by violence a legally constituted 
government. 
In the light of the history of the Catholic church in 
Spain, any other stand would have been startling. Under 
the monarchy the church was an established institution, a 
branch of the government, and every priest from the arch-
bishop down to the lowliest father in a distant village was 
on the state's pay roll. Education was largely in the hands 
of the church. Yet in some provinces as many as 60 to 70 
per cent o~ the population were illiterate, and Spain was 
one of the most backward countries in Europe in respect to 
public enlightenment. Nor did great culture exist in the 
huge monasteries and academies. The church had grown 
fat and decadent. Lawrence A. Fernsworth, a Roman 
Catholic and correspondent of the London Times, writing 
about Spain in Foreign Affairs for October, 1936, stated 
that "the church was the ally of the state; but the state 
was regarded by the people as their oppressor. At least, 
illiterate and hungering masses saw it that way. More-
over, the church constituted a heavy drain upon the eco-
nomic resources of the country. It was top-heavy with 
clergy-sixteen to twenty of them could be seen any day 
at some modest funeral, each one collecting his fee." 
The Catholic church of Spain was one of the largest 
landowners and business concerns of the country. It oper-
ated hotels and factories, owned department stores, numer-
ous electric power plants, newspapers, etc., and represented 
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a vast accumulation of capital. Its position within the state 
and its activity in the commercial world fixed its political 
sympathies. These, in turn, determined the attitude of the 
people to it. The church was regarded as just another 
feature of the ruling system. 
"In the time of the constitutional monarchy, and as a 
relic from the ancient connections between the crown and 
the church," Jose Maria de 'Semprun Gurrea, a member 
ef the Conservative Party and lecturer in the Philosophy 
Qf Law at the University of Madrid, wrote in the French 
Catholic review Esprit for November, 1936, "the king and, 
in his name, the government had the right of appointment 
to bishoprics. This right gave rise to unedifying intrigues, 
and the habit, equally unedifying, of classing bishops un-
der partisan titles. Such a bishop was known as the initiate 
of the Minister X; another of Y, the president of the 
counciL The system of promotion, legal in itself, was far 
from bringing about the choice of real spiritual leaders. 
Those elected were, with few exceptions, men too immersed 
in temporal matters, too closely c01).nected with great per-
sonages, the world of the nobility, and the greater bour-
geoisie which surrounds the high places of power and so-
ciallife. The bishops spent too little time with the people, 
and too much with persons of quality. Their world was 
rather 'the world,' and sometimes even 'the world of fash-
ion.' " There was therefore a wide gulf between church and 
people. The Catholic hierarchy neglected 'its duties to the 
masses. The Anglican Bishop of Gibraltar writing in the 
Church Times of February 26, 1937, said: "The Roman 
Catholic church in Spain has failed and failed lamentably 
to present Christianity faithfully to the nation." In Pueblo 
del Rio in 1934 I asked the women what they thought of 
the church. They replied: "The church does nothing for 
us. The church is for the rich. We are Moors," that is, _ 
non-believers. . 
When the republic came, it continued for some time to 
pay reduced subsidies to the church. But it disestablished 
the church and made public education secular. This condi-
tion prevails in most Western countries and has been ac-
cepted by the Catholics in them, yet it sufficed to align 
the Catholic church of Spain unalterably against the 
liberal forces of the republic. Openly and secretly the hier-
archy fought the republic from the very beginning to the 
day of Franco's uprising. In 1936. Prime Minister Azafia 
said t~ me apropos of the church iss"\le in Spain: "H~ who 
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fights in the front line may get a bullet." The church was 
conservative and opposed to the Popular Front. It played 
a political role. It was therefore treated as a political an-
tagonist. The Spanish church is only "reaping the whirl-
wind," said a report adopted by the eighty-ninth annual 
session of the New York East Methodist Episcopal Con-
ference on May 13, 1937. 
When the generals "" rebelled, the hierarchy naturally 
made common cause with them. Since the commencement of 
the civil war, bishops have blessed Franco's troops, priests 
in frocks have borne arms in the ranks against the Loyalists, 
and Franco has used churches as fortresses and arsenals. 
These facts are heavily documented and not denied. Here 
is a sample by G. L. Steer, famous British correspondent, 
in the New York Times of May 19, 1937: "The insurgents 
occupied a cemetery and a church. In the church tower at 
ten o'clock I saw their machine-guns at a distance of 400 
yards." The Loyalists would of course try to destroy that 
church. 
But even before the civil war the hostility of the people 
to the church was great. I myself regret the burnings of 
churches and monasteries in Sp·ain. But subjective reac-
tions are of little imporlance. The fact that Spaniards 
spontaneously sacked religious institutions and killed 
priests-the numbers have been exaggerated by the sensa-
tional press-is a revealing social phenomenon, and it can 
only mean that the church had no hold on their minds, 
that the people considered an attack on clericalism as part 
of their defense against fascism. This was inevitable when 
the clergy had given the impression of complete identifica-
tion with reaction. 
Catholic hierarchies abroad and the Vatican have defi-
nitely approved of Franco's rebellion against constituted 
authority. On February I, 1937, the Osservatore Romawo, 
official organ of the Vatican, wrote, "We do not know when 
Franco will take Madrid. We can only hope that it will 
be soon." Catholics everywhere have attempted to stir up 
sentiment against the Loyalists. The same thing happened 
in Spain. When Cardinal Hayes of New York says that a 
triumph of the "radical elements" in Spain would be "a 
menace to the entire civilization" (New York Post of 
March II, 1937) he merely rellects the much more violent 
attitude of his Spanish confreres. 
This stand by the Catholic church will harm Catholicism 
in Spain no matter who wins the civil war. The Catholic 
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hierarchy of Spain is fighting Franco's battles to its own 
hurt. Franco will go down in history as the man who 
bombed and bombarded civilians in Madrid and in the 
Basque Catholic country, who imported the hated Moors 
and foreign armies into Spain. He will be known as the 
general who started a revolt which laid waste vast terri-
tories and resulted in the killing of hundreds of thousands 
of men, women, and children. Spain will not forgive him 
even if he wins. Nor will Spain forgive his clerical abettors. 
Franco's hands are red with blood. The Catholic hier-
archy upholds those hands. The Catholic church in Spain 
will be the loser whatever happens. Putting it mildly, the 
London Catholic Herald said on August 21, 1936: "The 
church, it is certain, will gain nothing if it creeps back to 
power under Franco's bayonets. Only a thorough spiritual 
cleansing and revival can save Catholicism in Spain." Some 
will doubt whether a clergy that wished to lead its followers 
into the camp of a Franco is capable of such a spiritual 
e:ffort. Protestantism, which had some followers in Spain 
and which Franco is persecuting, may reap some of the 
benefits of the situation when peace is restored. But in 
general religion will suffer. The help which Catholic priests 
have given the rebel Franco has shocked many true 
Catholics. 
Throughout Europe the Vatican has found in fascism 
a rival and hostile philosophy. It fights fascism in Ger-
many. But in Spain it helps fascism, and in Spain it walks 
arm in arm with anti-Catholic Nazi troops. This inconsis-
tency will plague it in the future. 
The alliance of church, army, industrialists, and land-
lords represented a minority. There could be nothing in r 
common between Franco and the millions of undernourished 
peasants, or between Juan March, Franco's industrialist 
backer, and the radical workers of Bilbao and Barcelona. 
The overwhelming mass of Spain's 28,000,000 inhabitants 
had very little for which they would owe any gratitude to 
the feudal barons, manufacturers, staff generals, and 
bishops. 
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II. THE CIVIL WAR 
1. THE PEOPLE TAKE THEIR STAND 
The Franco revolt, therefore, was immediately rejected 
by the bulk of the Spanish nation. In the important cities 
of Barcelona, Madrid, Valencia, Bilbao, and Alicante, and 
in hundreds of large and small villages, the citizenry, armed 
literally with little more than staves and stones, over-
powered the garrisons and declared against General 
Franco. This phenomenon, which occurred in what is now 
Loyalist territory as well as in Franco territory, is · elo-
quently attested by an important rebel publication entitled 
"The Communist Atrocities," issued in London "by author-
ity of the Committee of Investigation appointed by the 
government at Burgos." In Almendralejo, it states, in the 
province of Badajoz, "the arrests [of "anti-reds"] took 
place from July 18 to August 6, the eve of the entrance of 
the troops into the citY"-which means that the Loyalist 
civilian government continued in control until Franco 
brought in his lVloors from Africa. Antequera, in the prov-
ince of lVlalaga, "experienced the reign of red terror which 
lasted from July 18 until August "12." Likewise Azuaga, 
in the province of Badajoz, which "from the first day of 
the military rising, July 18 till December 24 ... was in 
the hands of the Communist element." And Burguillos del 
Cerro, in the province of Badaj OZ, "was in the hands of 
the reds from July 15 till September 14, on which date the 
Nationalist army obtained possession of it." 
Further, "the reign of Communists in Espej'o , in the 
province of Cordoba, dates from July 22 ... till September 
25, the day on which our victorious troops occupied the 
town." "During a period of two months the inhabitants of 
Ronda, in the province of Malaga, were under the control 
of Communists." El Saucejo, a town of 6,588 inhabitants 
in the province of Seville, "was taken by the Nationalist 
forces on September 4." Until then the Loyalists ruled this 
place which is in the heart of Franco land. These instances 
could be multiplied endlessly. On the basis of Franco's own 
evidence it is clear that the Spaniards did not want Franco. 
There was not a single case where the civil population rose 
up and took over the power in the name 'Of the insurgents. 
It should be noted that "Nationalist" as it is used in this 
rebel publication always means the army of l\1oors and 
21 
Foreign Legionnaires, while "Communist" is a synonym 
for the Popular Front, which consists of many parties, in-
cluding some strongly anti-Communist. Thus on page 155 
there is a reference to the "Communist militia of the 
C. N'. T." The C. N. T. is an Anarcho-Syndicalist organiza-
tion. So that this phrase is like 'saying, the A. F. of L., 
headquarters of the C. I. O. 
During the first phase of the insurrection, in the latter . 
half of July and early in August, Franco had actually 
lost the civil war. The people took sides against him and 
successfully opposed his mutinous Spanish soldiers. But 
the rebels were in a position quickly to transport non.:.. 
Spanish troops into Spain and this, with the help of Ger-
man and Italian airplanes which were available to Franco 
three days after the uprising, soon turned the tide against 
the Loyalists. 
The Loyalist army consisted of local militias which 
joined the armed forces because they wanted to fight for a 
new Spain and against fascism, but not because they had 
any military qualities. 'Since the ~ apoleonic wars Spain 
had not participated in a foreign war. Its people were not 
trained and had no military psychology. The annual con-
script class was small. Almost all the officers and an esti-
mated 90 per cent of the rank and file of the regular army 
went over ,to Franco when he broke his oath. The militias 
had enthusiasm and devotion to the cause, but no exp€ri-
ence and few weapons. ' 
Even when the civil war was six months old, not every 
Loyalist soldier had his individual rifle. The scarcity of 
rifles in the early months brought many a disaster. Mexico 
sent 20,000 muskets in a moment of dire need but they did 
not suffice. I often saw arms at the front marked "Oviedo 
1896." Machine-guns were rare; so was artillery. In the 
beginning the government had no airplanes at all. Subse-
quently Andre Malraux, the famous French novelist, or-
ganized a foreign flying squadron which did valiant ser-
vice. Before long, however, it ceased to be a match for the 
large numbers of bombing and pursuit planes which were 
flown in from Germany and Italy. 
Under these circumstances Franco's army encountered 
little resistance in pushing up quicKly from Badajoz to 
Merida, to Caceres, to ,'Talavera de la Reina, to Toledo, 
and to the environs of Madrid. On November 6, the rebels 
stood at the gates of the capital. 
Meanwhile the ' insurgents had organized a government 
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a t Burgos. In official decrees dated August 3, September 
26, and September 28, Azafia's agrarian reforms of the 
early part of the year were canceled, and all -land which 
had been distributed among landless peasants was returned 
to the estate holders. Public instruction, an edict declared, 
would no longer be secular. Religious education, on the 
other hand, became compulsory in all schools. At the same 
time the monarchist flag replaced the banner of the repub-
lic. Franco thus stood revealed once more. He was looking 
backward. The people of Spain were well a.cquainted with 
the Francos. Franco had no need of promising the Span-
iards anything because they knew from his past what he 
would be in the future. The majority of the nation had re-
jected Franco and the reactionaries of his type on Febru-
ary 16, 1936. They rejected him in July when they over-
came his mutinous troops in Barcelona, Madrid, and other 
places. They were rejecting him every day in every way. 
Indeed, every day in Spain wa-s election day. There are 
many ways of voting, and the dropping of a ballot into an 
urn is the easiest and not always the most convincing. Lenin 
, once said that in 1917 "the Czarist army voted for peace 
with its legs. It ran away from the trenches." Often as I 
rode through the Spanish provinces during the civil war, 
peasants tilling their fields would drop their plows when 
they saw the car, lift a clenched fist, and shout "Salud!" 
~hose peasants did not know me. I dashed past them in a 
second. But ,they felt an inner urge ' to vote that morning, 
or afternoon, for Spanish democracy. In the months of 
September and October, as Franco pressed steadily on 
toward Madrid, I daily watched whole villages evacuate 
in front of his advancing hosts. Each time he approached 
a settlement, the bulk of its inhabitants packed their meager 
worldly goods on mule- or dog-drawn carts, placed the old 
grandmothers or young children on top, and drew off in 
the direction of Madrid. They did not know where they , 
were going. They slept by the roadsides. They had neither 
money nor food. They did not know what the morrow 
would bring. They knew only one thing: they did not want 
to live with Franco. Their evacuation was a vote of non-
confidence in the rebels. It was a vote for the Loyalists. 
The defense of Madrid is likewise a plebiscite. General 
Mola had boasted that he would drink coffee in a Madrid 
cafe on October 12, the "Day of the Race," the day on 
which Columbus discovered America. Franco declared, in 
the finest Spanish tradition of announcing military move-
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ments in advance, that he would take Madrid on November 
7, just to celebrate the Bolshevik Revolution. Then it was 
officially stated by the rebels that the Moors would enter 
the Catholic capital on Christmas Day. Yet Madrid still 
resists. 
2. THE MIRACLE OF MADRID 
The miracle of Madrid is intelligible only through the 
attitude of the civilian population. Any evening during the 
siege, after the noises of traffic had been hushed, I could 
open my hotel window and hear distinctly the rat-a-tat-tat 
of machine-guns and the individual cracks of rifles. One 
night, coming home from the front, it was brought home 
to me very graphically how close to Madrid the enemy was 
-the street cars, their windows painted blue to keep in 
their lights, had stopped after curfew hours and stood still 
on their tracks in the central streets and squares of Madrid, 
for the trolley car barns were in the hands of Franco. 
From most places in Madrid a twenty-minute walk brings 
one to the trenches. The fate of Madrid, therefore, rests 
in the hands of its women. I have seen these women, dressed 
for the most part in black, forming queues early in the 
morning to receive their meager rations of peas, rice, vege-
table oil, and bread. They often stood five abreast in a line 
thre~ hundred yards long. Not far away, their husbands, 
or brothers, or sons were fighting under rebel fire. Their rela-
tives might have been killed or wounded yesterday. They 
had left the older children at home.. They might return to 
fip.d their bodies mangled and crushed under houses 
bombed by German and Italian airplanes. Fuel was as 
scarce as food, and the water supply was turned off for 
at least ten hours during every twenty-four. The women 
waited patiently for hours, frequently holding babies in -
their arms. Hostile bombers have dropped bombs on such 
queues, bombs which are steel cylinders containing 100, 
or 200, or 500 pounds of explosives. Arriving at such a 
scene several minutes after bombing, one sees limbs~ scat-
tered, brains and intestines spattered against walls, and 
remnants of human bodies strewn in all directions. The 
wear and tear on the nerves and physical condition of the 
living is terrific. Those women of Madrid are the martyrs 
and the heroin'es. If ten thousand women of the capital rose 
up in protest and walked into the arms of Franco~ the 
siege of Madrid would be ended and Franco would be 
master of Sp~in's capital. But the women, as well as the 
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men, vote "no" on Franco. That is a plebiscite sealed with 
blood, a democracy paid for with a heavy toll of human-
lives. Instead of depression, fervor and faith in victory 
rule Madrid. As soldiers march through the streets on their 
way to the front, these black-dressed women of the queues 
give them the clenched-fist signal, and cry "No Pasaran!" 
-they shall not pass. The military are executing an order 
of the civilian population when they hold the city against 
the rebels., "Madrid must become the tomb of fascism," 
read the placards posted throughout Madrid when 
Franco's troops neared the city. The spirit within -the city 
stiffened the backbone of the Loyalist soldiers who fought 
in its outskirts. The men could not be less courageous 
than the women. 
3. FOREIGN PARTICIPATION 
Other factor-s strengthened the Loyalist army. During _ 
most of October the government forces were practically 
without the support of airplanes. Day after day Franco's 
procedure was as follows: His Junkers and Capronis would 
bomb a village or Loyalist position. Then the Moors would 
rush -in and occupy it. Franco also enj oyed a tremendous 
superiority of artillery, machine-guns, and rifles. In Octo-
ber small Italian whippet tanks made their appearance. 
For months the Non-Intervention Committee had been 
holding sessions in London. Germany, Italy, -and Portugal 
were partners to its agreement not to ship munitions into 
Spain. But the committee had become a laughing-stock. 
The whole world knew that Hitler and Mussolini were hon-
oring the agreement in the breach. The agreement meant 
that while France, England, and other truly neutral coun-
tries refused to supply arms to the legally constituted gov-
ernment of Spain, which by all principles of international 
law was entitled to such aid, the fascist states uninterrupt-
edly furnished the insurgents with weapons of war. What-
ever its intention, the effect of the non-intervention pact 
was profoundly disadvantageous to the Loyalists. 
- On October 7, accordingly, the Soviet government's rep-
resentative in the London Non-Intervention Committee 
told that body that "his government feared the situation 
created by repeated violations of the agreement would 
render the agr_eement virtually non-existent, and th~t they 
could in no case agree to turn the agreement into a screen 
shielding the military aid given to the rebels by some of 
the partic~pants in the committee." The Soviet govern-
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ment, therefore, declared that if the violations of the agree-
ment were not immediately stopped, Moscow would con-
sider itself free from the obligations arising out of the agree-
ment. The news of this statement released explosions of 
joy in Spain and Russia. The U. S. S. R. was hailed as 
Spain's great friend, and the newspapers were full of radi-
ant editorials and optimistic comment. On October 16, 
Joseph Stalin wrote: "The toiling classes of the U. s. S. R. 
merely carry out their duty when they give all possible aid 
·to the revolutionary masses of Spain. They realize that 
the liberation of Spain from the yoke of fascist reaction-
aries is not the private affair of Spaniards but the general 
concern of all advanced and progressive mankind." The 
concrete effects of these announcements began to appear 
during the third week of October in the fonn of airplanes 
and large, fast tanks. Franco's domination of the air was , 
no longer unquestioned. The sense of inferiority and help-
lessness engendered in a soldier when he sees his regiment 
bombed time and again while his own side has no planes 
was replaced by a feeling of pride and rejoicing. The mo-
rale of the Spanish army began to rise steeply. 
Help also came from foreign intellectuals and working-
TIlen. But the Loyalists felt the lack of shock troops consist-
ing of experienced fighters. Accordingly, several months 
after Franco rebelled, the Communist organiza tions in 
France and other countries organized an International 
Brigade in which World War veterans and men trained 
as conscripts in the armies of Europe enrolled for active 
service in Spain. There were many Communists, many 
Italian Socialists, Belgian Socialists, and non-party anti-
fasci~ts. ,;£,hey had all opposed fascism by attending meet-
ings, marching in street demonstrations,. distributing liter-
ature, etc., in their native countries. Now they were trans-
ferring the scene of their activities to the Madrid 
trenches, where the battle against international fascism 
was hottest. They were fighting for Spain, but at the same 
time they were directtng their shots against the f ascisms 
at home, for it was generally realized that a Franco victory 
would be a victory for Hitler and Mussolini and therefore 
for fascism generally. Spain had become the key to 
Europe's future political and social development. The men 
of the International Brigade came in legal and illegal 
fashion. Some of them walked hundreds of miles, stole 
across frontiers, and arrived at recruiting headquarters 
footsore a.nd penniless. They hailed from farm and bakery 
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and steel mill. They hailed also from universities, sheltered 
homes, and iv'ory towers. With hardened proletarians 
came men like Ludwig Renn, ex-German nobleman and 
aristocra t, Nazi prisoner and outstanding novelist; Lu-
kach, Hungarian author, a W orld War veteran, who was 
given the rank of general; Ralph Fox, British Communist 
novelist and author of a life of Lenin; several British~ 
poets; the son of a British rear admiral, and others. They 
were all volunteers, the Lafayettes of the modern industrial 
age. Just as Madrid was about to fall into Franco's lap, 
the International Brigade's first unit, 1,900 strong" 
marched into the fray. For the first time the Moors were 
stopped. For the first time the militiamen sa'v the heels 
and backs of Franco's soldiers. The Spaniards learned that 
it could be done. The International Brigade became a 
practical school for Spanish units. The militiamen grew 
to love their foreign comrades, and fought best when some 
of their companies and battalions were amalgamated with 
sections of the International Brigade. The international 
Popular Front against fascisnl had become a reality. The 
International Brigade served not nlerely by its own fight-
ing but by raising the fighting capacity of thousands of 
Spaniards. 
The size of the International Brigade has been wildly 
exaggerated, partly as an implied tribute to its military 
achievements, and partly, too, in an attempt to justify the 
sending of large units of German and Italian infantry. 
But in the middle of January, 1937, the International 
Brigade's total strength was no more than 13,000, and 
at no time has its effective strength exceeded 20,000. Yet 
it has written a glorious page in the history of the Span-
ish civil war. 
On November 6 the ~Iadrid government fled from the 
capital to Valencia. The Junta, or Committee of Defense, 
which assumed charge, was burdened with the double task 
of checking Franco and supplying a hungry, cold, bomb-
torn city, swollen by the advent of several hundred thou-
sand refugees. It acquitted itself so well that many in 
its entourage began to have ambitions for it and conceived 
of the Junta as the provisional revolutionary government 
of Spain. Gradually, however, prestige and authority re-
turned to the Caballero Cabinet. It alone could send tlte 
reinforcements, munitions, food, and money without which 
Madrid would be lost, and it steadily established its con-
trol over · the rest of Loyalist Spain. 
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Before the siege of Madrid had lasted a month, it be-
came apparent that Franco could not take the city with 
the limited forces at his command. He had vast storehouses 
of guns and other equipment, but too few men. The Moors 
and Foreign Legion were being decimated in stubborn at-
tacks on the city, and reinforcements' could not be ob-
tained. Most Spaniards refused to ' fight for him, and those 
who were pressed into the rebel ranks proved to be unreli-
able material. At this stage-about the middle of Decem-
ber, 1936-Franco had lost the war a second time. ' He 
could make no progress, and to stand still was disastrous. 
There was only one solution: he ~appealed to Italy and 
Germany for soldiers. Practically all Franco's pilots and 
tank drivers were German or Italian. Many of his gunners 
were likewise Italian or German. But the fascist powers 
had sent no compact fighting units to Spain. Franco now 
asked for them, and Hitler and Mussolini complied. The 
figures are necessarily in dispute. Nevertheless, it is a safe 
estimate that Germany shipped no fewer than 10,000 and 
perhaps as many as 20,000 trained soldiers to the Franco 
lines, while Mussolini was more generous with at least 
50,000 and perhaps 80,000 or 90,000. Portugal did its bit, 
too. 
The Soviet Union has sent no soldiers to the Loyalists. 
There are at most a dozen Soviet citizens in the Interna-
tional Brigade and several hundred former white or 
counter-revolutionary Russians from France, who by join-
ing sought to document their new political attitude. They 
are endea VOTIng to return to lVioscow via Madrid. In other 
respects, however, the military assistance given the Loyal-
ists by the D. s. S. R. was similar to that given to Franco 
by Gennany and Italy. Both sides received airplanes (plus 
pilots), tanks, cannons, and machine-guns from their for-
eign friends. 
Yet fascist intervention in Spain differs completely from 
the Soviets' help to the Popular Front. The Valencia gov-
ernment has stated publicly that it possesses evidence of 
conversations which took place in Rome in 1934 between 
Mussolini and Spanish reactionary politicians wherein the 
Duce undertook to assist in the forcible overthrow of the 
Spanish republic and its replacement by a mona.rchy. Data 
is available to support a hypothesis that Germany and 
Italy were informed in advance about Franco's proposed 
coup against the Madrid government. General Sanjurjo, 
initiator of an abortive anny rising in August, 1932, who 
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was to have been the leader of the 1937 revolt but whose 
airpl.ane crashed when he attempted to fly from Lisbon to 
rebel territory on the second day of the insurrection, was 
in Berlin shortly before July 17, and Franco himself was 
in touch with German representatives. The presumption of 
preliminary knowledge and aid is a strong one, but the 
final demonstration waits upon the publication 'of further 
aocuments. It is known, however, that three days before 
the revolt started, Italy ordered six military airplanes to 
Franco in Spanish Morocco. Three of these crashed in 
French Morocco, and Governor General Victor Denain re-
ported to Paris on the nature of the craft, stating that 
their pilots had received their orders on July 15 (M anches-
ter Guardian,. March 16, 1937). Germap. and Italian air-
planes were carrying Moorish soldiers from Morocco to 
'Spain in the second fortnight of July. The situation, ac-
cordingly, amounted to this: a disloyal general had no 
sooner risen against his government than two foreign 
powers were ready to give him the wherewithal of victory. 
From the point of view of established bourgeois govern-
ments this would appear to be a most dangerous precedent. 
In similar circumstances the German Henlein party in 
Czecho-Slovakia might seize a few villages or towns in 
provinces coterminous with Germany and then invite the 
Reichswehr to come to its assistance. The result might 
quickly become a European war. When, in addition to 
military equipment, Germany and Italy placed whole regi-
ments of trained soldiers on Spanish soil, the world was 
face to face with a full-fledged invasion of a foreign state 
which had been guilty of no crime or even mild offense 
against either of the invading governments. Treaties have 
long ago ceased to be serious considerations in intern a- . 
tional affairs. But ·for open and cynical flouting of laws, 
rules, and pacts, recent events in Spain have no equal in 
all post-war anarchy. 
The Soviet Union, on the other hand, scrupulously ad-
hered to the non-intervention agreement which it, in com-
mon with a score of other powers, including Germany, 
Italy, and Portugal, had signed. (Soviet trade unions, 
however, contributed f09d and clothing worth many mil-
lions of gold rubles to their fellow-workers in Spain dur-
ing the early months of the civil war.) It was only in Octo-
ber, after the non-intervention compact had become a 
generally recognized farce, that the Soviets commenced to 
aid the Spanish government with war material which it 
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was entitled under intern a tional law to purchase unham-
pered and at all times. 
Soviet assistance to the Loyalists differed also in its mo-
tives from that which fascist states accorded Franco. It 
has been said that Franco promised Germany and Italy 
monopoly concessions in the Bilbao iron mines, the Alma-
den mercury fields near Ciudad Real, the Rio Tinto copper 
mines, and other mineral deposits of Spain. It would be 
natural if the rebels, having won, would out of gratitude 
and to annul their indebtedness for munitions shipped, 
grant Germany and Italy special privileges in exploiting 
the wealth of their country. As the London Economist of . 
May 15, 1937, put it: "A government placed (and prob-
ably maintained) in power by German and Italian bayonets 
and bombers would be in no position effectively to resist 
foreign encroachment on Spain's natural resources." Re-
ports have also appeared regarding the promise of spheres 
of influence or even colonies to Germany and Italy. Thus 
the Balearic Islands are said to have been made over to 
Italy, and it is an established fact that Italian troops and 
agents have made themselves very much at home on the 
island of Majorca. As part of this scheme, the Germans 
were to receive the Canary Islands or coaling and naval 
stations on them, as well as a preferred position in Spanish 
Morocco, in which Germany had manifested keen interest 
during the Kaiser's time. 
But the stakes in Spain are even higher than these im-
portant considerations. Spain has an invaluable geographic 
position, especially for Italy. A foothold in Spain or the 
friendship of a vassal Spanish government might be deci-
sive in a future war. Italy,. thanks to the conquest of Ethi-
opia, has become the active, and the even greater potential, 
rival of the far-flung British Empire, and the intrench-
ment of Rome in Spain would extend Italian control of the 
western Mediterranean. For similar reasons Germany would 
be pleased to dig in in Spain and l\lorocco. 
Italy and Germany, bent on expansion, are maneuvering 
in Spain for new strategic positions. The Spanish civil 
war has in this sense ceased to be merely a struggle between 
two domestic factions and has taken on many of the as-
pects of an international conflict. The first battle of the 
second World War is now being fought in Spain. A vic-
tory for Franco would bea victory for Hitler and Musso-
lini. Fascist intervention in Spain is not an isolated phe-
nomenon. It is part of a chain of events which began when 
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the Japanese marched into Manchuria in September, 1931. 
The ease with which Tokyo accomplished this violation of 
foreign territory and the ineffectiveness of the protests of 
foreign powers and the League of Nations undoubtedly 
facilitated Mussolini's decision to attack Ethiopia in Octo-
ber, 1935. Similarly, Mussolini's triumph in East Africa 
notwithstanding efforts by the League of Nations and 
Great Britain to block him showed Hitler that he had 
nothing to fear if he scrapped international treaties and 
militarized the Rhineland. He did so on March 7, 1936. 
This momentous occasion passed off so smoothly that both 
Hitler and Mussolini were convinced they could now defy 
the rest of the world, especially if they acted together. 
This is the pre-history of their intervention in Spain, and 
the fact that in Spain, too, they met with little resistance 
from England and France gave them an even greater con-
tempt -for the vacillating democracies. A fascist triumph in 
Spain would thus prove that in Europe today he who dares, 
wins. Depending, of course, on the internal strength of 
Germany and Italy, these countries could then launch other 
adventures in which the benefits obtained by them in Spain 
would grant them an additional initial advantage. The 
democratic powers would be in danger. 
In Great Britain and France these truths are under-
stood by many persons. Captain B. H. Liddell Hart, the 
_well-known British military authority, for instance, has ex-
pressed concern for the "life-line of the Empire" in the 
event of a fascist victory in Spain. "The danger is so ob-
vious," Captain Hart stated (see Manchester Guardian, 
of April 15, 1937), "that it is hard to understand the 
eagerness with which · some of the most vocally patriotic 
sections of the British public desire the rebels' success. A 
military-minded Spain allied with the fascist powers might 
make Gibraltar untenable and even threaten our route 
round the Cape by an air base in the Canaries. The danger 
would be even worse if a hostile air and submarine base 
was established in the Balearics." But those who determine 
British policy were torn-between their desire to shield the 
British Empire by thwarting German and Italian designs 
in Spain, and their distrust of the Loyalists, whom they 
regard as Communists or a preparation for communism. 
This economic or class prejudice p·aralyzed the natural 
British inclinations to prevent the enemies of the; Empire 
from pressing their schemes against it. Likewise in France 
the possibility that Germany and Italy would create an-
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other front south of the Pyrenees, which might be disas-
trous to France in case of a German attack on Alsace, and 
the fact that an Italian force in the Balearics could stop 
France from bringing over her colonial troops from North 
Africa, should have created overwhelming sympathy among 
the bourgeoisie for Loyalist Spain. This, coupled with the 
very vigorous championship of the legal Spanish govern-
ment on the part of the French trade unions, might have 
found more concrete expression than the non-intervention 
agreement. But here, too, economic prej udices against the 
Loyalists frustrated national desires. The result was that 
both France and England became split personalities in 
rela tion to the Spanish civil war. Divided allegiance was 
especially obvious in England, where sympathies often 
swayed with the fortunes of war. In the beginning, when 
Franco seemed to be the sure victor, British sentiment 
leaned toward him. Later, the gallant defense of Madrid 
swung British sympathies to the other side. Because of the 
balance between what the rulers of England ought to do ,to 
safeguard their Empire, and what they think is their duty 
toward the maintenance of capitalism, there is always this 
uncertainty in her attitude. If England and France were 
clearly anti-fascist at home, they would experience no diffi-
culty in carrying out a firm anti-fascist foreign policy. But 
they are not clearly anti-fascist, and they therefore lack 
the firmness which might have benefited the Loyalist cause. 
In· fact, their attitudes have had the effect of helping 
Franco's cause. 
The Soviet Union, however, had no such problem. By its 
philosophy and social structure anti-fascist, it passed 
through no inne; struggle before deciding where its sym-
pathies in Spain lay., There were questions of expediency 
and technical obstacles. Delicate diplomatic formalities had 
to be observed in order that the benefit which the Loyalists 
received from Soviet assistance might not be· canceled by 
the hostility it provoked in England and France. The Bol-
sheviks were first of all concerned lest a Hitler and Musso-
lini victory in Spain hasten the second World War. Moscow 
detests war. It has nothing to gain from war. It could ob-
viously entertain no territorial ambitions in Spain. Rus-
sia's pro-Loyalist activity in Spain partakes of the nature 
of war prevention. In the present state of world armaments 
and international tengion, there is no use talking peace or 
yearning for peace~ The only way to achieve peace is to 
stop the fascist aggressors who have made wars and who 
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are the most likely initiators -of more wars. Fascist regimes 
require frequent foreign triumphs to sugarcoat the pill of 
domestic hardshi1Js. Peace, or the inability to start and 
successfully conclude a military adventure, consequently 
becomes an embarrassment to the fascist powers and an 
element in their weakness. By preventing war Russia weak-
ens fascism. By weakening fascism Russia helps the democ-
racies who lack the unity of purpose to help themselves. 
This is therefore a service to the British and French em-
pires, which, sa ted now, want the status 'quo and no war. 
But it is above all a service to the new Spain that is to rise 
on Franco's grave. Soviet efforts on behalf of the Loyal-
ists, accordingly, stimulat"e rev'Olution in one country, 
stabilize the capitalist democracies in other countries, and 
contribute to the downfall of totalitarian systems in still a 
third group of nations. Anyone who seeks to simplify this 
situation is departing from the complicated reality of mod-
ern times. Moscow may not be interested in safeguarding 
British imperialism against its fascist rivals. But this 
would be the inevitable by-product of the establishment of 
a liberal or social-democratic, or even soviet state in Spain. 
The only way of attacking British imperialism' via Spain 
is to let Franco win. 
It is strangely paradoxical but true that the same set 
of Soviet actio;ns staves off an invasion of the U. S. S. R., 
strengthens the French . and British bourgeoisies, under-
mines the Spanish bourgeoisie, and upsets the scheme of 
Italian and German fascism. The naive and malicious con-
tend that .each of these results is deliberate and welcome. -
The discerning realize that no one result is obtainable 
without all the rest. Paris may be using the Bolsheviks, 
but the Bolsheviks get their benefits from Paris, too. If 
there were no such exchange, neither party would be fool-
ish enough to play the game. But since the two sides are 
so different, the advantages they derive from their rela-
tionship must be of a contradictory character. They reflect 
a crude working arrangement between two separate 
worlds, the bourgeois democra,cies and the slowly emerging 
Soviet democracy, unequally menaced by a common enemy 
-f ascism. 
The prospect of the spread of communism to another 
country is as appealing to Russia as the chance of implant-
ing fascism in Spain is to Germany and Italy. Soviet aid 
to Spain has undoubtedly strengthened the Communist 
Party there and created much pro-Communist sentiment. 
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But the Bolsheviks do not believe that a revolution can be 
exported. They hold that the need for revolution grows 
in national soil. They are convinced that ultimately Spain 
will become Communist. But they do not wish to interfere 
in internal Spanish affairs because they know how deeply 
Spaniards would resent it. They know intervention would 
defeat its own ends. In interviews granted to the press, 
Franco . has stated that he is a fascist and favors the 
Italian type of corporative state. He has formally estab-
lished himself as fascist dictator. Hitler congratulated him 
when he did so. But loyalist Spain has set up no dictator-
ship. And its leaders insist that it will remain a democratic 
state. Moscow openly applauds this intention. 
4. FACTIONS Al\IONG THE LOYALISTS 
At present Loyalist Spain is a democracy. On April 15, 
1937, in approximately the same week that Franco abol-
ished all parties except the Fascist Party, Premier Largo 
Caballero assured a delegation of British women 'members 
of Parliament, consisting among others the Duchess of 
Atholl, Ellen Wilkinson, Dame Rachel Crowdy, and 
Eleanor Rathbone, when ' they asked him whether Spain 
would become a soviet state, that it would be a "parlia-
mentary democracy which would utilize the experience 
gained by the civil war." He emphasized the fact that his 
opinion was based as much upon political as upon moral 
considerations. "A feeling of union and solidarity has 
arisen among the various political parties who support the 
legitimate government," he said, "and this feeling will sur-
vive the war, with no political party attempting to impose 
its particular platform upon the others." The Duches.s of 
Atholl made this comment after the interview with Cab~l­
lero: "The war in Spain is a war for freedom. The struggle 
of the government's troops is a struggle for the independ-
ence of Spain as well as for the security of England and 
France." 
The exigencies of war obviously limit the freedom of 
individuals. But the Popular F 'ront is in its essence demo-
cratic because it consists of parties with varying philoso-
phies and policies; what the Loyalist government does is 
the result of a give and take and often of preliminary 
negotiations and pourparlers between groups. Some have 
regarded the Communists' advocacy of democracy in Spain 
as a tactical maneuver to mislead foreign democracies and 
bourgeois liberals into supporting the Loyalists. This in-
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terpreta tion is wrong; such a trick would soon become teo 
transparent for use. The democracy slogan means that the 
Communists have no desire to establish in Spain a dictator-
ship guided by one party as in Russia. Spanish conditions 
are different. The Communists do not wish to suppress the 
Anarchists or Socialists or left Republicans or any anti-
fascist group. All these parties are united ' in fighting 
Franco. The Popular Front combines the most variegated 
elements, and it was not without reason that on February 
8, 1937, Lord Cranbourne, British Assistant Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, stated in reply to a question in 
the House of Commons that "the British government are 
sure that the Valencia government was legally constituted 
and represented all the Spanish parties except one or two 
small groups." 
The Popuiar Front extends from the far right to the 
far left. It includes on the conservative flank the Basque 
Catholics, who, though separated geographically from the 
rest of Loyalist Spain, have stubbornly defended their 
country and the autonomy which the Cortes accorded 
. them on October 1, 1936, against the onslaught of the 
lVIoslem Moors, the Italians, and the anti-Catholic Germans 
who committed the barbarous crime of Guernica. Moving 
from right to left, we come to the left bourgeois Repub-
licans-consisting of Azaiia's party, . lVIartinez Barrio's 
party, and the Catalan left-who represent the views of 
the intellectuals and the middle class of shopkeepers and 
small peasants, and then to the right Socialists-'whose 
leader, Indalecio Prieto, is himself a prominent Bilbao 
industrialist-the left Socialists, the Communists, and the 
Anarchists. The Popular Front, accordingly, is a coalition 
of captalist and anti-capitalist groups. This marriage is 
not one of convenience. It rather reveals with exciting 
clarity the essence of the Spanish struggle. The Basque 
Catholics are fighting Franco because he has announced 
himself in favor of a strongly centralized government. He 
stated in an interview with Roy Howard of the Scripps-
Howard papers that he would not tolerate Catalonian 
autonomy, and the Basques have al~ays assumed that he 
would destroy their free status. And although the Basque 
Nationalist Party is essentially bourgeois, yet it, as well 
as the left Republicans, are allied with the radical prole-
tariat and peasantry because they realize that Spain's past 
rulers were a hopelessly unintelligent lot who had brought 
the couN-try to the brink gf economic and political ruin. 
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From the domestic point of view the struggle in Spain 
is a contest between the forces of darkness, who are ready 
to sacrifice the country in order to save their feudal sys-
tem, and all those who feel that the only hope for a pros-
perous and happy Spain lies in rebuilding Spain on · a 
new basis. Torn between the alternative of a rotten social 
structure based on absentee landlordism and a new economy 
with many Socialist features, the forward-looking capital-
ists chose the latter after the recalcitrance of the reac-
tionaries in the first five years of the republic had made a 
middle-of-the-road solution impossible. The best bourgeois 
minds of Spain support the Loyalists because they love 
their country and their liberty. Franco and fascism would 
destroy both. 
During the two Azafia administrations the Spanish lib-
eral bourgeoisie tried, with as little offense as possible to 
the economic royalists, to initiate some changes which 
might improve material conditions under capitalism and 
start Spain on the road to progress. They were stopped 
at every step by the Francos. It was indeed in the midst 
of just such a period of mild bourgeois reform that 
Franco rose up to smash the republic. The enlightened 
bourgeoisie's very existence depended on the success of 
Azafia's cautious program. It would have helped the small 
farmer, the merchants, and the industrialists. But the land-
lords in agrarian Spain were protecting only themselves-
and doing: that badly. Accordingly, when Franco started 
the civil war, the progressive capitalist elements had little 
choice. Franco had rej ected them. The Socialists and Com-
munists had not only tolerated but even supported them. 
Azafia, Martinez Barrio, the Basque Catholics, and other 
propertied groups are sur~ today that a fascist victory 
would safeguard Spain for medievalism and poverty, 
whereas the triumph of the Loyalists, even though it might 
ultimately inconvenience Spanish capitalism, would benefit 
Spain. The forward':'looking Spanish bourgeoisie, in other 
words, is likewise a split personality. But its nationalism 
dominates its class interests, especially since those class in-
terests would not be served by the political intrenchment of 
the landlords. The owning classes of Spain are on both sides 
of the barricades. For the sake of a happier Spain, one pa~t 
of the bourgeoisie has made itself the willing confederate of 
the proletariat. In this respect the Spanish civil war is very 
different from the Russian civil war. 
Largo Caballero, the Socialist leader, became Prime 
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Minister on September 4, 1936. This signified that the left 
Republicans were becoming less important. Socialistic 
trends acquired- gre.ater momentum. When the civil war 
broke out, many landlords and big business 'men in Loyalist 
territory fled, or were hurriedly tried and executed as 
fascist sympathizers, or were murdered by peasants in re-
taliation for years of poverty and subjugation. Their 
properties were thereupon confiscated. The confiscation, -
however, was not always orderly or conducted by state 
authorities. Often the peasants, united in the Casa del 
Pueblo, or People's House, took the land and subdivided 
it among themselves, or worked it collectively. In the cities 
hotels, department stores, large commercial enterp'rises, fac-
tories, and means of transportation were sequestered by 
powerful trade unions like the Socialist-controlled U. G. T. 
(Union of General Workers) or the Anarcho-Syndicalist 
C. N. T. (National Confederation of Workers), or by the 
several political parties, or by departments of the govern-
ment. Through this chaos one tendency, however, was 
clear: the immediate result of the outbreak of hostilities 
was a blow to capitalism in Spain. Franco made this social 
revolution. The expropriated capitalists should file their 
complaints with the rebels. But for the insurrection the 
Republicans might have plodded along in power for years. 
Even a Socialist government might have hesitated to take 
very ra'dical measures. But what failed to happen in years 
of peace took place in the first three months of war under 
the impact of Franco's attack on the legitimate government. 
Nevertheless, the numerous small capitalist farmers were 
spared, as were petty shopkeepers and similar enterprises. 
Formally, the sequestration of capitalist property was a 
war measure against political enemies of the Loyalists. Yet 
formalities do not count where the social implications are 
so obvious. Socialism has made great strides in Loyalist 
Spain. ·Capitalism, nevertheless, persists, and it is not the 
policy of the government to crush it. Indeed, th~ Commu-
nist Party has printed posters urging the protection of 
the small proprietor in village and city, and other radical 
parties have conducted propaganda to the same end. While 
capitalism persists, the left RepubliGans have a part to 
play in the political life of Spain. But it is not a leading 
part. The participation of the bourgeois parties in the 
Loyalist government is also a symbol. To capitalists in 
fascist Spain, and to the outside world, it is intended as 
an indication that Valencia has no plan now of setting up 
37 
a soviet state or a Communist regime after victory in the 
civil war. 
What will happen in Spain when hostilities end will de-
pend on circumstances. The attitude of the bourgeois 
powers and of the Soviet Union will be a decisive factor. 
The extent of the ruination and destruction consequent 
upon the civil war will be another consideration. Experi-
ments which might arouse the hostility of certain classes 
may not be regarded as conducive to reconstruction. In 
Soviet Russia economic distress resulting from intervention 
and civil war forced Lenin to introduce the New Economic 
Policy, which was a concession to capitalism. There are 
no perfect analogies in history; yet what the Bolsheviks 
did may serve as a precedent for Spain. The length of the 
civil war will determine many a social policy when it is ·over. 
The active formula tors of Loyalist policy are, and prob-
ably for some time to come will be, -the Socialists, Com-
munists, and Anarcho-Syndicalists. The Socialist Party 
counted approximately 75,000 members when the civil war 
commenced, but there were 1,200,000 Socialist trade union-
ists in the U. G. T., which was strong in both city and 
village. The Socialists were divided into right and left 
wings, the first representing a reformist or gradualist ten-
dency and the latter a more radical one. Yet neither wing 
was ever anti-Communist or anti-Moscow as other Socialist 
and Labor parties are. Moreover, the experience of the 
early years of the . republic converted numerous moderates 
to a revolutionary attitude, and the civil war did the rest. 
While old and sometimes personal antagonisms may per-
sist between right- and left-wing Socialists, the party is 
today more united than ever, and it has been found that 
many a former right-winger cooperates more enthusiasti-
cally with the government, and what is equally significant, 
with the C'ommunists, than some left-wingers. 
The liaison between Socialists and Communists is inti-
mate. In March, 1936, the Communist Party in Spain had 
20,000 members. A month later it had 50,000. Today it 
numbers several hundred thousand in Loyalist Spain alone. 
The record of its fighting units at the front has given it 
much prestige. At one time the Fifth Regiment, which was 
really an army corps consisting of some-25,000 to 30,000 
soldiers, Communists all, and including artillery, armored 
tanks, and the like, practically held the front around 
Madrid. This and similar circumstances have attracted to 
the party many Spaniards whom the civil war brought into 
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active public life for the first time. The virility of the COlTI-
munist Party and the unity within it have also acted as a 
lodestone to left-wing Socialists, and a number of these 
adhered to the Communist Party in December, 1936. Wh~n 
this proved irritating to Socialist leaders, the Communists, 
practicing the self-effacement which has characterized 
their work ever since hostilities began, discouraged such 
persons from entering their ranks. The Communists have 
not advertised their strength. They have avoided every 
stand that might dis~pt the Popular Front or irritate 
their political rivals among the Loyalists. When it devel-
oped that party armies interfered. with good military dis-
cipline the Communists set the example by disbanding the 
Fifth Regiment. They subordinate all else to victory in the 
war. The Socialists take the same .view. In Catalonia the 
Socialists and Communists have amalgamated into one 
party, called the P. S. U. C. The Socialist and Communist 
youth organizations of Spain merged . more than a year 
ago, and the fusion of all Spanish Socialists and Com-
munists into a unified body finds an increasing number of 
protagonists. 
The relation between the Communists and Anarchists, 
however, has lacked this harmony. In the minds of naive 
people, and of some statesmen, anarchism and communism 
are identical. But their philosophies, if not their millennial 
aims, are poles apart, and their methods are diametrically 
opposed. The Communists believe in strict discipline and 
action by masses to compel acceptance of their program. 
Unless it is forced upon them, they reject violence except 
in the ultimate attempt to seize power. Anarchists, on the 
other hand, believe in no subordination of the individual to 
his group and in sporadic terror. Hating the existing cap-
italist system TIO less than the Communists, they may de-
stroy prominent persons or physical objects more to give 
expression to that hatred than to achieve a practical goal. 
The Communists do not condemn government as such; they 
merely prefer their own, whereas the Anarchists, seeing the 
evils of governments which oppress them, hold that all gov-
ernments are inherently bad, including one which they might 
set up themselves. 
The Anarchist movement has a long history in Spain. 
For decades the Russian Bakunin was better known and 
more widely accepted in Catalonia and Andalusia than was 
the German Marx. In the past Spanish Anarchists have 
refused to cooperate with Socialists or Communists, whom 
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they regard as reactionary. Important strikes were some-
. times broken by too precipitate or too violent Anarchist 
action. Rumors that minor Anarchist leaders could be and 
had been bought by manufacturers acquired wide currency. 
The hostility between Anarchists and Marxists was con-
siderable. 
'l'he Anarchists hailed the founding of the republic but 
refused to establish any contact with even its most radical 
supporters. True to their principles, they refrained from 
participating in elections or sending · delegates to the 
Cortes. In 1934 and 1936, however, occasions did arise 
when Anarchists threw some voting strength to a Repub-
lican parliamentary candidate who was in danger of being 
defeated by a reactionary, and when Franco started his 
rebellion, the F. A. I. (Federation of the Anarchists of 
Iberia) and the C. N. T., the trade-union organization 
guided by the F. A. I., immediately joined the Loyalists. 
The Spanish Anarchist movement is deeply' revolutionary. 
Most of its adherents are workingmen and poor peasants, 
and no other alignment was to have been expected. In the' 
first days of the revolt Anarchists bravely stormed the 
Franco garrisons in Barcelona, and quickly suppressed the 
mutiny. . 
The Anarchists became the allies of the Popular Front, 
but they were not peaceful bedfellows. It was frequently 
stated in Spain during the early months of the civil war 
that many fascists and Franco friends who had been unable 
to escape from Loyalist territory entered the F. A. I. or 
C. N. T. not only for self-protection but also to commit 
acts which would disrupt Loyalist- unity and discredit the 
Loyalist cause. That the Anarchist organizations opened 
their doors wide when the rebellion started is a fact. In..., 
deed, whereas the Socialist trade unions made admission 
doubly difficult in order to shut out questionable charac-
ters who might strive to join to save their skjns, the C'. N. T. 
is known to have coerced people to come in. The infiltration 
into Anarchist bodies of anti-Loyalists may therefore have 
influenced Anarchist policy to some extent, but if it did it 
merely accentuated an existing tendency. The moment the 
civil war started, the Anarchists, if they had had their 
way, would have summarily killed off all persons in any 
manner connected with the old social order and have up-
rooted every capitalist institution. Among the protagonists 
of the old order they would certainly have included ' most 
bourge~is left Republicans, even though these were 
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staunchly anti-Franco and were fightIng as well as they 
could on the front. They would have expropriated not only 
the big landlords and large industrialists who favored the 
rebels but also the petty farmers and small storekeepers~ 
who, though capitalists, were pro-Loyalist because they 
had suffered under the regime of feudal landlordism and 
rapacious industrialism. 
Actually the Anarchists carried out as much as possible 
of this progralu. In Catalonia, their stronghold, and else-
where too when possible, they confiscated hotels, factories, 
bus-lines, taxi companies, etc., and operated them in de-
fiance of the government's endeavors to coordinate busi-
ness activity. Commercial establishments were placed under 
the direction of employees' or workers' committees which 
often mismanaged them and reduced the output through 
their lack of executive ability, when the prosecution of the 
war required maximum production. In villages where 
peasants were joyfully dividing sequestrated estates among 
themselves, the Anarchists, occasionally at the butt of the 
rifle, insisted on the wiping out of individual holdings and 
the collective cultivation of land. 
Moreover, when justice, as administered by the govern-
ment, appeared too slow and cautious to the Anarchists, 
they did not hesitate to take matters into their own hands. 
If there were really fascists in Anarchist ranks, such arbi-
trary procedure enabled them, under cover of darkness, to 
serve their own ends by doing away with friends of the 
republic or, by firing off their rifles and throwing hand 
grenades .in the dark, ' to sow panic and create an impres-
sion of chaos. 
At the same time Anarchist military units did not acquit 
themselves too well at the front. In the early months of the 
war, of course, all militiamen ran away from the enemy 
on the slightest excuse. They were bad soldiers-because 
they were not soldiers at all. But the Anarchists sinned 
most frequently in this respect. The Loyalist army began 
with very few officers, and the few were untrained. Some 
were politically unreliaple, a factor whic~ undoubtedly ac-
counted for a nu:t;nber of military defeats. But whereas 
many units accepted the officers sent them and attempted 
to introduce some semblance of military discipline, Anar-
chist units were ruled by soldiers' committees. Whether a 
particular formation would execute the commander's orders 
and go into battle was decided by a general vote and often 
in the negative. Everything was democratic" Ralph Bates, 
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the able British novelist and authority on Spain, tells how 
he saw Durutti, the beloved Anarchist leader who would 
have had the rank of general, s.tanding somewhere about • 
hundredth in line with pot and pan waiting for his lunch 
while he was in command of thousands of Anarchist soldiers 
at the Aragon front. This was typical of an approach 
which destroyed much of the value of the Anarchists' pres-
ence on the battlefield. 
The Anarchists were a problem and sometimes a nui-
sance, but their profound hold on large sections of the 
population, their revolutionary zeal, and the devotion of 
their overwhelming maj ority to the Loyalist cause were a 
real, and an even greater potential, asset. They were of the 
flesh and blood of anti-fascism, and it remained for them 
and the other anti-fascists to find a modus vivendi.1 They 
themselves wanted to belong. At the end of September and 
the beginning of October, 1936, they~ began to insist on 
being taken into the government. No, since they wor-
shiped phrases, they demanded the abolition of the Cabinet 
and the creation of a "Counsel of Defense" with strong 
Anarchist representation. They would then not have en-
tered a "government"-they were opposed to governments 
and Anarchists would not be ministers. Subsequently 
they dropped this make-believe and plainly asked minis-
terial portfolios for their leaders. Within the Popular Front 
parties this aroused opposition. It was contended that the 
Anarchists lacked a sense of responsibility, that they could 
not control their followers, and that they would not co-
operate whole-heartedly. Yet the other view prevailed, and 
in November, 1936, the Caballero Cabinet was reorganized 
to include four Anarchist ministers. The popular Catalan 
Anarchist leader, Garcia Oliver, became Minister of Jus-
tice. Many Anarchists made an honest effort to collaborate. 
The realities of office had a sobering effect. A number of 
Anarchist leaders had always been aware of the preemi-
nence of the front. This applied especially to Durutti, who 
spent most of his time with the army and helped to instil 
military discipline in his Anarchist brigades. Unfortu-
nat~ly, he was killed at Madrid in December. 
The left Republicans, Socialists, and Communists saw 
the problem as one of focusing Anarchist attention on the 
front. A social revolution was jmplicit in the civil war. 
Capitalism had already received serious' blows, and the 
direction of social trends in the future had been estab-
lished. To push this too far might mean to destroy it. 
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Lenin did not collectivize in 1918. What good would fann 
collectives and socialized industry be if Franco won? To the 
peasant, fascism is a very tangible evil. He identifies it 
with landlords, political bosses, and oppressive, reactionary 
government. The struggle against these arouses his en-
thusiasm. It has already brought him concrete benefits. 
By May, 1937, seven and a half million acres of estate 
lands had been confiscated and distributed. The peasant 
will fight like a lion to prevent the landowners from re-
turning to power. If the peasants themselves choose to 
cultivate their estates collectively, there can be no objec-
tion. But ~o superimpose the collective system when the 
farmers resist it-as they have in many localities-is un-
wise. In Russia, too, during the civil war of 1918-21, the 
peasants generally sided with the Soviets and enabled the 
Bolsheviks to defeat the whites for the negative reason 
that the whites would have brought back the landlords. Yet 
partly because all Spanish Anarchists had not been con-
verted to this point of view and partly because of the 
ancient rivalry between Marxists and Anarchists, the lat-
ter continued to concentrate much of their attention on 
the rear. In January _and February, 1937, three charges 
against the Anarchists were heard: that their brigades at 
the front often refused to fight, that munitions from the 
inadequate gove1,i1ment resources placed in their hands for 
fighting Franco were retained in cities behind the lines for 
what some Anarchists regarded as an inevitable clash with 
Communists and Socialists, and, finally, that by compul-
sory collectivization, Anarchist groups had forced peasants 
in. villages of Catalonia and the Levant provinces to take 
up arms against the authorities. On the other hand, Anar-
chists could get things done when they wanted, and their 
aid in transportation and in mobilizing food and other 
supplies was frequently appreciated by government depart-
ments. At the same time, the ability of the Valencia gov-
ernment to centralize authority in its hands . gradually in-
creased, and arbitrary acts by Anarchists consequently 
tended to decrease. Willy-nilly, therefore, there was more 
Anarchist collaboration with the government. 
A large irreconcilable and non-cooperative Anarchist 
faction remained, and especially in Catalonia it was fre-
quently able to dominate the situation. This faction found 
comfort and aid. in the Trotskyists of the P.O. U. M., 
which was formed by the Workers' and Peasants' Party, 
led by Maurin, and by the Trotskyist Communist opposi-
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tion, led by Andres Nin. The P. O. U. M. refused to iden-
tify itself with Trotsky's Fourth International and was 
prepared, despite the Trotskyist hostility to the United 
Front, to participate in a Popular Front government in 
Catalonia. But in its general antagonism to collaboration 
with liberal-bourgeois anti-fascists and in its insistence on 
immediate and complete social revolution (these two p.osi-
tions go hand in hand), the P. O. U. M. is essentially 
Trotskyist. Perhaps the sharpest issue was agricultural 
collectivization. The Trotskyists had opposed it twelve 
years after the successful Soviet revolution in Russia, but 
insisted on it in the midst of the Spanish civil war when 
victory was still in doubt, and when the socialization of 
farming was sure to weaken the pro-Loyalist sentiments 
of many peasants whose help was essential to military suc-
cess. The Trotskyists were strongest in Barcelona. Else-
where,'" although they had confiscated some hotels, buildings, 
and private automobiles in Madrid and other centers, they 
were never very numerous. They were, however, well led 
and vociferous. They leaned on 'the Anarchists, and because 
Anarchist politicaJ thinking was often naive, could in-
fluence Anarchist action. 
When the war broke out, the two stock Trotskyist argu-
ments militated against the popularity of the P. O. U. M. 
One argument was against popular fronts, the other . 
against the Soviet Union. In Spain, particularly after 
July, 1936, the Popular Front had become a symbol. It 
represented the unity without which fascism could not be 
vanquished. The Trotskyist op-position to the Popular 
Front4 accordingly found a more and more hostile reception 
among the masses. 
The people likewise frowned on anti-Sovietism. Even 
before the broad stream of airplanes and munitions began ~ 
to flow from the Soviet Union to Spain, Russia was very 
popular with all anti-fascists. I arrived in Spain in the 
middle of September, 1936, and' took the night train from 
Valencia to Madrid. All the coaches were crowded with 
soldiers, but I managed to find a bench on which I lay down 
and fell asleep. In the middle of the night I was awakened 
by a tap on the shoulder, and -when I opened my eyes six 
militiamen with rifles stood over me. Their commander, 
wea.ring the red-and-black silk neckerchief which marked 
him an Anarchist, politely asked me for identification 
papers. I showed him the safe conduct I had received from 
the Spanish embassy in Paris. He wanted something more. 
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I showed him my pass from the Valencia provincial govern-
ment. This too did not suffice. 
"Are you an Italian?" he asked. 
I said "No." 
"Are you German?" 
"N 0." 
. Then I drew out my passport and said, .. "I am a North 
American. " 
He said, "Fascist or anti-fascist?" I took the passport 
from him, opened it, and said, "You see this ? It's a Soviet 
visa," and pointed to the sickle and hammer. Then I opened 
another page and showed him a second Soviet visa. Then 
I opened another page and showed him still another. At 
this he raised his hand in the clenched-fist sign and said 
"Salud, camarada!" This from an Anarchist a t a time 
when Russia had only sent food, clothing, and industrial 
raw materials. A few months later Russia was beloved by 
all Spaniards who knew that Soviet aid had saved the 
Loyalist cause, and everybody knew it because there are no 
secrets in Spain. Trotskyist membership dropped accord-
ingly. It had become impossible in Spain to criticize Stalin 
as- a counter-revolutionary and nationalist. 
The combination of Trotskyists and dissident Anarchists 
continued, nevertheless, to give the Loyalist government 
considerable anxiety and trouble. Quiet assassinations, the 
seizure of arms shipments intended for the front, and open 
outbreaks like that in Barcelona in May, 1937, have 
diverted the attention of the Valencia Cabinet from its 
chief task, the military one. But the left Republicans, 
Socialists, and Communists now hold that the secret of 
their relationship with the Anarchists lies in a firm policy -
by a strong government which will preclude any party or 
group from attempting to carry out in any part of Loy-
alist Spain a program opposed to that of the central 
government. This explains the formation of the Juan 
Negrin Cabinet in May, 1937, to succeed Largo Caballero. 
The Anarchists are now expected to behave, and good 
behavior will presumably teach them the wisdom of co-
operation. Many Anarchists , perhaps the majority, al-
ready see the desirability of an aggressive Popular Front 
policy. More will be converted to it. 
5. THE QUESTION OF ATROCITIES 
These difficulties, and the internal political situation in 
Loyalist Spain generally, are the clue to the question of 
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atrocities which has received so much prominence in the 
press. In like manner the political constellation in the 
Franco country explains the murders and executions which 
have taken place there. Atrocities have been committed by 
both sides. Civil war is a climax of factional hatreds. Yet 
it exacerbates these hatreds. The two contending sides 
become more sharply demarcated than ever and each openly. 
avows its intention of destroying the other. With passions 
thus loosed, and especially where volatile, temperamental 
Spaniards are concerned, much bloodshed is inevitable. This 
is what makes foreign mediation or a truce especially diffi-
cult to arrange. The Spanish civil war has been no friendly 
picnic. Hosts of marked Loyalists lived in Franco terri-
tory, and innumerable partisans of Franco remained within 
reach of the Loyalists. These could stab their respective 
enemies in the back; each party in the struggle, therefore, 
sought to make them harmless. When the rebel ai=my con-
verged on Madrid, Generall\10Ia, who was at that time in 
charge of the operation, frivolously announced that he 
was approaching from different points of the compass with 
four columns of troops. A "fifth column" of active rebel 
sympathizers inside the capital, he stated, would greet and 
assist him-when he entered it. What would be more natural, 
then, than for the Loyalist government immediately to 
seftrch out the suspected members of this "fifth column" and 
destroy them. Franco did similar things. 'Vhen he took a 
town or village, his special police quickly coralled men and ' 
women who, according to informants, had borne arms in 
the Loyalist ranks, trade-union members who were sure to 
be hostile to him and who might engage in sabotage in 
factories, and peasants who, by word or de'ed, manifested 
their unfriendly attitude. He made short shrift of them 
without going carefully into individual cases. Nevertheless, 
Douglas Jerrold, a Catholic apologist for Franco, says in 
the April, 1937, American Review: "There have been no 
atrocities on the Nationalist side ... there was no need 
for them.'" It is good that he writes this way, for no one 
now will believe anything else he says. 
There are very telling differences between Loyalist 
atrocities and rebel atrocities. Rebel atrocities have been 
more nun1erous for a simple reason: there were more Loy-
alist sympathizers in rebel territory than rebel sympathizers 
in Loyalist territory. Many reactionaries, landlords, indus-
trialists, and fascists were forewarned and escaped before the 
insurrection cOlnmenced, or took advantage of the chaos of 
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its early. weeks to flee to districts where Franco held sway or 
go abroad. But peasants and workingmen usually do not 
have the funds or the private means of transportation for 
escape, and the idea, indeed, would rarely occur to them. The 
millions of plain people who thus remained exposed to 
Franco vengeance far outnumbered those pro-rebels who 
fell into the hands of the Loyalists. 
Civil war is by definition an attack on established gov-
ernment. It weakens that government, and this was espe-
cially true of the weak Madrid government in the summer 
of 1936, deprived of an army and the major portion of 
its police force and supported py divergent groups which 
it could not fully control if they chose to resist control. 
Practically all Loyalist atrocities were perpet rated by in-
dividuals or groups acting on their own initiative without 
benefit of courts. The period in which such arbitrary acts 
were possible lasted for several months. Gradually, how-
ever, the authority and police power of the central govern-
ment grew. It prohibited lawless acts of terror, and the 
Loyalist press and radio made propaganda against them. 
After a while offenders were punished~ Rebels, spies, and 
others of course continued to be arrested by the authorities, 
but they were given fair public trials, and opportunities 
were granted for appeals against sentences . . Normal 
methods of administering justice succeeded the anarchy of 
the early period. Loyalist atrocities were thus a concomi-
tant of the disorder that resulted when a small but power-
ful minority sought to upset a none-too-powerful but pop-
ular government. But the number of excesses steadily 
tapered off, and befo~e the civil war was six months old, 
a trocities as a phenomenon had ceased to exist in Loyalist 
Spain. This ' does not mean that isolated assassinations did 
not take place. 
With Franco, however, atrocities have been continuous 
and must remain so. They are not an accident but a per-
manent policy, a weapon to suppress opposition. Yet that 
opposition invariably recurs where it has presumably been 
stamped out. Franco foresaw this possibility from the 'Very 
beginning. At Tangier on July 29, 1936, he declared to a 
correspondent of the London News Chronicle that he would 
"save Spain from Marxism at whatever cost." 
"That means that you will have to shoot half of Spain?" 
the correspondent queried. 
Franco replied: "I repeat, at whatever cost." 
The rebel terror has taken the form of individual shoot-
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ings, small group shootings, and mass executions. The 
illustra tions are legion. Writing in the pro-Franco New 
York Evening Journal of May 5, 1937, H. R. Knicker-
bocker said: "Going to the front one day near Santa Olalla 
we passed five old women just killed by a fascist fighting 
squad, their bodies lying in a ditch. They were peasant 
women of the better class, cleanly dressed a~d averaging 
about sixty ,years of age .... A little later, in the village 
of Alcorcon, we came across the bodies of two youthful 
members of the red militia, bound back to back with wire, 
and burned alive." But leading a ' revolt of minorities 
against the people, Frailco has had to introduce a special 
terroristic feature-wholesale atrocities. The killing of ap-
proximately 2,000 Loyalists by machine-gun in the bull 
ring of Badajoz has been accepted as a historical fact. 
When the rebels captured Toledo, the government had suc-
ceeded in evacuating two hospitals but found no time to 
empty the third. Moors, officered by Spaniards, approached 
this hospital. The chief physician barred the way. He was 
felled by a revolver shot and then the rebel soldiers went 
from ward to ward' hand-grenading the wounded in their 
beds. Later they killed all the doctors and nurses too. This 
is an authentic a ted event which has been related in all its 
details in the British House of Commons by members of 
Parliament who collected the information. Such mass mur-
ders are not isolated episodes. The bombing from airplanes 
and shelling of purely civilian sections of Madrid have 
gone on month after month when no military objective 
could be achieved. This is the major atrocity not only of 
the Spanish civil war but of modern times. The annihila-
tion of the Catholic population of Guernica in the Basque 
country by German airplanes and the shelling of Almeria 
by German warships are too well known to require repe-
tition. 
Such large-scale extermination reflects Franco's political 
philosophy and his future prospects. The Loyalists, too, 
could bomb civilians. It requires no great art to drop mis-
siles on the. excellent target furnished by a large city. In 
fact, there has been pressure on the Loyalist government to 
retaliate for such deeds as the continued bombing of Madrid 
by doing likewise. The government has refused to yield to 
this pressure. Its planes have probably killed civilians who 
lived in the immediate n~ighborhood of munitions factories, 
military airdromes, or railway stations which were the ob-
. j ects of attack. It is impossible to direct an aerial bomb to an 
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exact address. But these cases have been few, and in no in-
stance have Loyalist pilots deliberately taken a civilian 
target, whereas Franco's airmen and gunners have done so 
repeatedly. There must be a reason for this distinction be-
tween the behavior of the two factions. The Loyalist govern-
ment confidently expects.. when the war is over to govern all 
of Spain with the consent of the governed. And it has no . 
desire unnecessarily to embitter parts of the population. 
Franco knows, however, that if he wins, he can rule only 
by means of the iron heel and foreign bayonets. In such 
circumstances the opinion of the masses does not count. He 
cannot expect to gain their favor anyway. The terror he 
engenders by °indiscrilninate shootings makes for the 
"peace and order" which observers have noted in Franco 
territory. It facilitates the task of administration. ~ 
6. FRANCO'S DILEMMA AND THE ULTIMATE OUTCOME 
Franco's problem of finding a sufficient number of Span-
iards ready to fight for him and carry him to victory re-
mains insoluble. Without Hitler and Mussolini, Franco 
falls. When the question of taking foreign troops . out of 
Spain arose, John T. Whitaker, the New York Herald 
Tribune's veter~n correspondent, telegraphed from Rome 
(May 23, 1937): "The moment for such withdrawal has 
not come yet, it is believed here, because without foreign -
support Franco's forces would succumb to the Spanish 
Loyalists." And further, "If Spain were left to the Span-
iards, the Loyalist Valencia government would win." Yet 
Franco has received infinitely more munitions from abroad 
than the Loyalists and has enjoyed in addition the support 
of at least 90,000 German and Italian trained soldiers, 
whereas the government's International Brigade never con-
sisted of more than 20,000 individual volunteers. ° 
Despite the fact that the fascist powers shipped whole 
regiments to Franco, their presence did not enable hiln to 
register very sensational gains. Early in February, .1937, 
insurgents captured Malaga, the southern port, and Italy 
took full credit for the victory. According to statements 
in the Italian press, relayed to the New York Times on 
February 10 by its Rome representative, "The backbone 
of insurgent General Gonzalo Queipo de Llano's army is 
made up of 16,000 Italian soldiers who landed at Cadiz 
! early in January. Sixty German bombing planes also are 
I reported to be participating in the operations. It is note-
worthy that this report is issued by the official Italian news 
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agency, Stefani." But Malaga is very far from the center 
of Loyalist military activity, and like Toledo in September, 
1936, it was surrendered practically without a serious 
struggle, thanks to inefficiency and perhaps also to treach-
ery in the government's General Staff. In March, ho~ever, 
when several Italian divisions massed on the Guadalajara 
front and attempted completely to encircle Madrid, they 
were decisively routed by the Loyalists in the now famous 
battle of Brihuega. The government troops took 2,000 
Italian prisoners and captured tremendous stores of Italian 
army equipment, as well as ' official documents which origi-
nated in Rome. Some of the prisoners declared that when 
the transports took them from I tali an harbors they 
. thought they were going to Ethiopia. Others had been in 
East Africa and facsimiles of photographs of naked Abys-
sinian women found on them, togethe! with voluminous 
pictorial evidence of Italian intervention in Spain, were in-
cluded in a Valencia White Book. The raw militiamen of 
yesterday had routed Mussolini's legions. Nor did General 
Mola have an easy task in attacking Bilbao, although his 
army was heavily reinforced by Germans and Italians and 
supported by scores of foreign planes, whereas the Basque 
defenders had no airplanes for many weeks and were very 
short of guns, munitions, and food. 
If Spain were hermetically sealed and non-intervention 
made a reality, the legitimate government would win within 
a few months. Foreign help! has weighed more with the 
rebels than the Loyalists. - If foreigners fighting on both 
sides . were withdrawn, the advantage would be on the side 
of the Loyalists. That is why Italy, which has larger stakes 
in the Mediterranean than Germany, hesitates to forsake 
her role as invader of Spain. Spain is a phase of a looming 
struggle between the British and Italian empires which 
lna y be the feature of the next decade of European history. 
l\fussolini is loath to admit defeat. Yet he may be com-
o pelled to, for the Spanish civil war has revealed the weak-
nesses as well as the strength of the fascist countries. 
Hitler and Mussolini were in a position to dispatch inval-
uable assistance to Franco, quickly and without seeking 
approval, and then cynically deny that they were doing so. 
"rhe dicta tors knew their minds. That was their advantage. 
But Spain has served to show that it would be easier to 
call the fasoists' bluff than was formerly believed. This 
has been their loss. The fighting in Spain indicates that 
German and Italian airplanes as well as pilots are inferior 
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to Soviet airplanes and pilots. This fact, attested by in-
nUInerable eyewitnesses of air battles over Madrid and 
other fronts, has been accepted by the war offices of Euro-
I)ean countries and has entered into their calculations re-
garding the imminence of a European war. Moreover, the 
disastrous defeat of the Italian divisions at Brihuega un-
dermined Italian military prestige in Europe, and experts 
began to mark down the value of Mussolini's arm~ In 
Paris, London, and Moscow it is therefore hoped that 
Spain may have taught Berlin and Rome a lesson in 
caution. They have seen the shortcomings of their arma-
ments and the high quality of those that might be used by 
at least one nation against them. Perhaps, too, the Ger-
mans were disappointed with their Italian allies, and vice 
versa. Having tested their forces in Spain, the fascist 
powers may not be as ready to provoke the democracies 
as they were before the Spanish civil war started. The 
cause of peace is advanced. 
With their usual contempt for democracies and "reds," 
Germany and Italy believed that Franco would easily over-
whelm the Loyalists and establish a fascist Spain. In the 
summer of 1936 they were sure that a few airplane squad-
rons, some guns and rifles would produce a rebel victory. 
Disillusioned but undaunted, they later did not doubt that 
the support of tens of thousands of German and Italian 
troops would mean that Franco could march through the 
country and sweep the foe before him. But when this failed 
to materialize, when indeed whole Italian divisions suffered 
defeat, the problem assumed a different aspect. Berlin and 
Rome now realized that they had undertaken more than 
they had bargained for, that this was a major task which 
was beginning to drain their resources. It is estimated that 
the first seven 'months of the civil war ' cost Germany 
$200,000,000. And when the wounded started coming back 
to Germany from the Spanish front,S, Germans began to 
murmur against Hitler's Spanish adventure. The Reichs-
wehr leaders had always opposed Nazi intervention in 
Spain as too dangerous and costly. Now the layman who 
was missing his butter and eggs and paying more for all 
commodities in order presumably that Germany 'might have 
guns, began to wonder why he should be pulling in his 
belt so that Franco could get those guns. Social discontent, 
already a significant phenomenon, grew. 
Similar sentiments were noted in Italy. John T. Whit-
aker, writing from Rome to the New York Herald TribufM 
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of May 23, 1937, described the average Italian's reaction 
thus: "The Italians, however, are frequently worried about 
the situation. The man in the street hears that Italy has 
sent 70,000 men to Spain and has spent almost two billion 
lire ($105,000,000), and the information does not appeal 
to him. After the two-year financial strain caused by Italy's 
war with Ethiopia, the Italian people see in the Spanish 
strife a deadlock which may last many more months." 
Franco's foreign aid, a strain upon the giver yet inade-
quate for the receiver, has, to make matters even worse, 
produced -friction in the rebel camp. The Hitler-Mussolini-
Franco triangle does not live happily together. The Ger-
man staff in Spain has on occasions insisted upon one plan 
of attack and Franco on another. The Italians have some-
times proposed still a third. There have been bickerings 
and quarrels, and once, according to reliable reports, a 
pitched battle with many casualties took place near the 
Guadarrama Mountains between Nazi troops, taught at 
home to believe in their racial superiority, and black Moors. 
As H. R. Knickerbocker, who has spent many months with 
Franco's army, put it in the New York Evening Journal of 
May 1, 1937: "The Germans in Spain despjse the Italians 
and detest the Spaniards. The Italians hate the Germans 
and loathe the Spaniards. The Spaniards abhor both Ital-
ians and Germans and everybody is sick of war." 
These disagreements make Franco's prospects look even 
worse than they were originally. To help him is like pouring 
water into a bottomless barrel. This fact has apparently 
impressed itself on Hitler, and Germany, anxious, too, de-
spite the "Berlin-Rome axis" not to offend Great Britain 
excessively (England is fast rearming), has grown cooler 
toward Franco. Mussolini is more deeply involved, and he , 
has attempted, sometimes by provoking bombing incidents, 
to rekindle Berlin's zeal. The prospect cannot seem bright 
to II Duce-70,000 Italian soldiers, he must say to him-
self, have not enabled the rebels to win. Franco will appar-
ently need 100,000 additional Italians for a prolonged 
period-perhaps a year-to crush the Loyalists. Can Italy 
afford this outlay? To render less assistance means merely 
to drag out the war. Yet to render enough for victory may 
bring England and France into the conflict. For these 
powers could scarcely countenance the intrenchment of an 
army of 200,000 Italians in Spain. 
Logic, accordingly, would demand that Italy retire, and 
this may indeed be history's way of writing "Finis" to the 
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Spanish civil war. But there is also a possibility that the 
fascist dictators, having failed to help Franco win, may 
give him sufficient support to keep him from losing. If 
Rome and Berlin each sent twenty-five airplanes a month-
and these could easily be flown in, for there is no air patrol 
of Spain-Franco could continue to fight for a year unless 
revolts completely demolished his rear guard. This method 
would be a gamble on some development in the international 
or Spanish situation which might turn the tide in favor 
of the rebels. The slaughter and destruction would go on 
and recuperation would be delayed. This epitomizes the 
fate of the classes which Franco represents: they can ruin 
Spain but not rule it. If "rule" means to govern to the 
advantage of the people, Spain has been misruled for cen-
turies. 
Spain will have no peace · until the elements now fighting 
Franco are victorious. The possible course of the civil war 
must be judged not by any morning's sensational telegram 
but in the larger perspective of historical analogies and 
fundamental trends. Napoleon sent gigantic armies into 
Spain, hundreds of thousands of men. He devoted years to 
an attempt to subdue Spain. He failed. That is an ill omen 
for Hitler and l\fussolini. Between 1914 and 1918 Germany 
won most of the battles. In the end,- split by internal social 
difficulties and faced with an economically superior com-
bination of allies, she lost the war. The map is no exact 
mirror of the military situation in Spain. In December 
Franco was in the suburbs of Madrid, yet on the verge of 
defeat. Not the amount of territory conquered, but the 
rna terial, human, and moral resources of the opposing 
camps will determine the issue of the conflict. The question 
is not simply who pushed whom back in today's fighting 
but what the victory, if it was Franco's, cost him in men 
and arms and whether it demoralized the Loyalists or 
taught them the need of greater discipline and political 
cohesion. 
Franco's resources are limited. He will have first what he 
gets from abroad. He lacks money, and as Mr. Knicker-
bocker said in Hearst's N ew York Evening Journal, "he 
need~ man-power." Knickerbocker stated on l\1:ay 3, ·1937, 
that "General Franco has refrained from recruiting heavily 
[because] he could not rely on the rank and file of peasants 
and workers to the same degree as the reds could with 
their promises of heaven on earth for th.e common man." 
Thanks to this "promise of heaven on earth for the 
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common man," the Loyalists are forging a mass army 
whose fighting qualities, officers, and equipment steadily 
improve. They enj oy, moreover, the benefits of a vast finan-
cial reserve which, according to a statement made to me 
by Gabriel Franco, Minister of Finance in Madrid on April 
6, 1986, then amounted to 2,227,000,000 pesetas in gold 
and 686,000,000 in silver, and was not much smaller in 
September of the same -year. 
The Loyalists hold Barcelona, Spain's gl·eatest ~etal­
lurgical center, which -after numerous difficulties of a tech-
nical as well as political nature -is beginning to produce a 
widening .flow of munitions. Additional strength likewise 
accrues to the Loyalists from the elimination of old army 
officers whose devotion to the anti-fascist cause is doubtful. 
The presence of these men in the military apparatus has 
been responsible for defeats and difficulties at the front. 
Finally, the smoothing out of dissension among parties 
unalterably committed to the struggle against fascism 
would give the Loyalist army greater striking power. The 
internal political situation is a complicated one. Yet the 
problems it presents need not resist solution interminably. 
The outstanding fact is that the Valencia government's 
reserves of strength are far from used up. Indeed, they 
have barely been scratched. The Loyalists have not yet 
exploited all possibilities of improving their position. Time, 
therefore, plays into their hands. As the months go by, 
not exhaustion but an intensification of effort, greater 
firmness of purpose, and warmer popular enthusiasm char-
acterize the legitimate government's activities. ,It lost much 
time getting started, whereas the rebels, having taken the 
initiative, were early prepared to deliver a series of quick 
blows. Franco has lost that advantage. ~is situation be-
comes increasingly difficult. The government, on the other 
hand, is continually opening up new pockets of energy. 
It feels certain of ultimate success. 
The outcome of the civil war will have far-reaching re-
percussions on international affairs and on world social 
developments. But intertwined with these is the paramount 
. issue--Spain's future. Will Spain lie prostrate, chained by 
oppressors and smothered in the ashes of her cities and the 
rivers of congealed blood that have been added to her for-
mer misery? Or will the Spanish nation rise revitalized, 
fatigued but inspired by a new sense of self-confidence? 
For the first time in centuries the people themselves are 
shaping their fate in the civil war. They will insist on 
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doing so when it is ended. The social upheaval that accom-
panies the fighting has caused a ferment that will not soon 
stop. Millions who thought of themselves as akin to pack 
animals, robots that dug the earth or tended machines, 
have now become keenly aware of the role they can and 
should play in molding their life and that of their country. 
This realization, in a revolutionary era, is the psychological 
spark which releases endless quantities of physical and in-
tellectual power for the task of national transformation. 
New strata of humanity, previously separated from light 
by a thin crust of aristocracy and plutocracy, are churned 
up to the surface and demand work and opportunity. 
Franco would have to stamp them back into the depths 
agaIn. 
Spain has been waiting, too patiently, for this awaken-
ing. She is rich in talent and natural resources, and can 
contribute much more than she has contributed to Europe 
and to mankind. The Loyalist leaders, especially Juan 
Negrin, grow excited and eloquent when they touch the 
subject of Spain's upbnilding under a new regime. Engi-
neers will dam the rivers and spread life-giving waters over 
the sun-baked fields of Castile, Andalusia, and Estrema-
dura to increase their crops and give more food, health, 
and education to a suffering peasantry. Railways and ports 
must be developed, mountains explored for mineral treas-
ures, and known deposits so worked that the country as a 
whole and not a privileged few may benefit. The unspoiled, 
freshly upturned layers of society will draw new wealth 
from the earth. More industries will rise to employ the 
energies of the people and bring them comfort, pleasure, 
and leisure. Spain will come back into Europe and help to 
remake Europe. 
When death ceases on the battlefield, a nation will be 
reborn. Only this could justify all the carnage. For Spain 
to revert to her feudal sleep would mock the dead and tor-
ture the living. 
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in our country being far away from The Nation 
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